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ABSTRACT 
The Shi’a Crescent is a term used to refer to a region spanning three major countries: 
Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran. These countries each have a large and active population of Shi’a. 
Shi’a is one of the two main Islamic sects. The thesis finds the formation of a politically 
unified Shi’a crescent unlikely. It highlights the importance to regard Shi’a identity as a 
dynamic mechanism that can change the political stage in the Middle East. The study 
focused on the three intended countries of the proposed “crescent.” Each was examined 
thoroughly and independently, in order to compare and contrast common concerns, 
interest, and circumstances that can lead to a possible unity of Shi’a in the region. 
Therefore, the research focused on three factors: sociopolitical representation, 
socioeconomic oppression, and the Shi’a identity. A greater emphasis is given to the 
reasons that lead Shi’a to maintain a distinct identity, rather than assimilating nationally, 
because maintaining this identity allows for bids for support and power beyond the state 
level. It is necessary for the United States to recognize that the regional uses of Shi’a 
identity have implications for the stability of the states.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE SHI’A CRESCENT: 
A MISCONCEPTION OF SHI’A ALLIANCE  
The “Shi’a Crescent” is a term that refers to a region spanning three major 
countries: Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran. These countries each have a large and active 
population of Shi’a. Shi’a is one of the two main Islamic sects. In the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, unrest in the Middle Eastern region created new context for Shi’a 
political and social movements. This has drawn a new level of international interest in the 
capabilities of the Shi’a populations, both domestically and regionally. The United States 
has been especially interested in recognizing the possibilities of a Shi’a unification across 
state lines and the possibility of a political and military power shift in the region, the 
Council on Foreign Affairs explains: “Saudi Arabia and Iran have deployed considerable 
resources to proxy battles, especially in Syria, where the stakes are highest. Riyadh 
closely monitors potential restlessness in its oil-rich eastern provinces, home to its Shia 
minority, and has deployed forces along with other Gulf countries to suppress a largely 
Shia uprising in Bahrain….Iran has allocated billions of dollars in aid and loans to prop 
up Syria’s Alawi-led government, and has trained and equipped Shia militants from 
Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan to fight with various sectarian militias in Syria”1.   
An analysis of the Shi’a structure in each of these countries reveals different contexts and 
motives domestically, which may override regional political ambitions.  
Although this thesis finds the formation of a politically unified Shi’a Crescent 
unlikely, it highlights the importance in regard to Shi’a identity as a dynamic mechanism 
that can change the political stage in the Middle East. This thesis examines the reasons 
that led Shi’a to maintain a distinct identity, rather than assimilating nationally. 
Maintaining this identity allows bids for support and power beyond the state level. It is 
necessary for the United States to recognize that the regional uses of the Shi’a identity 
have implications for the stability of the nation states in the Middle East.  
                                                 




Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the 
Western world was suddenly and almost unanimously put on high alert from the threat of 
Islam and its fundamentalists. Countries in the Middle East, such as Iran, and its 
neighbors to the east, Afghanistan and Pakistan, had been considered a hotbed for Islamic 
fundamentalists and extremists personified by their Shi’a populations. Iraq, with its 
balance of Shi’a and Sunni populations, the latter of which had been the ruling power in 
the country for a longtime, had been considered a barrier to help fend off these 
extremists’ ideologies and maintain a semblance of stability in the region. This barrier, 
however, had been considered somewhat fragile and in constant need of reinforcement, as 
the Iraqi former vice president, Tariq Al-Hashmi explains: “Sunnis had no other option 
but to defend themselves and use arms. We reached a point of to be or not to be”2. Once 
the Shi’a–Sunni civil war broke out in Iraq, it became apparent that this barrier may have 
finally been breached and that stability and security in the area was under imminent 
attack. Although the Shi’a–Sunni conflict in Iraq had very little direct impact on the 
United States and its allies, it represented a major threat to U.S. and Western interests 
abroad and required a major shift on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Many 
countries in the region, such as Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, and even Gulf countries, such 
as Bahrain and Qatar, were home to large populations of conservative fundamentalist 
Shi’a. These populations and their ideologies were generally less favored by Western 
governments, which considered them a threat to their interests in the region. Thanks to 
pro-West governments and oppressive regimes in the Middle East, these populations and 
ideologies were mostly kept silent and under control. Iraq’s stability has been a signal of 
the stability of the Middle East; that is, if Iraq became disordered, the region’s stability 
would at stake because Iraq borders Jordan on the west, Turkey on the north, and Iran on 
the East. Because Iraq is also a wealthy country because of its natural resources—such as 
water, agriculture, and, most importantly, oil—it has also played a major role in the 
region’s politics. Its role became more apparent during the Iraq-Iran War as Iraqi Shi’a 
were accused of loyalty to Iran, which made it a strong, capable military force in the 
                                                 
2 Council on Foreign Relations. “The Sunni-Shia Divide”. Accessed November 23, 2014 
http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/p33176#!/?cid=otr-marketing_url-
sunni_shia_infoguide.  (Council on Froeing Relations) 
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region. Therefore, many countries within the region regarded Iraq as a model country for 
defense and a balancing power against external threats from countries, such as Iran or 
even Israel. The Shi’a–Sunni conflict in Iraq, however, once again represented a shift in 
balance and a major threat to the order of the country, and consequently, to the entire 
region. The civil war was viewed as a potential powder keg that could ignite instability in 
the Middle East and un-silence the Shi’a population.  
The term Shi’a Crescent became popular as soon as the United States occupied 
Iraq. Some politicians believed that in case of a sectarian conflict in Iraq, there would be 
a strong possibility of a Shi’a emergence leading to the creation of a unified state or ally. 
This unification is supposed to occur when the Shi’a-led government in Iraq seeks 
support from and identifies with other Shi’a political and military powers in Iran, Syria, 
and Lebanon. These countries would form Shi’a heavily populated geographic “crescent-
shaped” region spanning Iran, southern Iraq, and Lebanon. However, these countries are 
not the only states in the region with Shi’a populations. Other countries in the Arab 
peninsula, such as the Gulf States of Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar, and even Saudi Arabia, 
are also home to Shi’a groups.  
Politicians are well aware of the potential impact this instability would have on 
other countries in the region, including but not limited to, Jordan and Israel. 
Comparatively speaking, Iraq has been a lesser of all evils to its Jordanian neighbor: with 
the Palestinian–Israeli conflict still ongoing, with Lebanon torn since its civil war, the 
presence of Hezbollah, and an oppressive Ba’athist party (a party born after the birth of 
Nasserist movement, and it called for the Arab nationalism) ruling Syria, this leaves Iraq 
as a source of very little headache. That, however, could quickly change with the rise of 
pro-Iran Shi’a movements that could extend into Syria and Lebanon and unify the Shi’a 
in the Middle East. It could also inspire Arab nationalism and an anti-West movement 
that could potentially take over what then would be the vulnerable country of Jordan.  
The idea of a Shi’a Crescent is crucial, not only to the region, but also to global 
politics as well. This Crescent has the potential to spread quickly to countries where Shi’a 
are present. Most of these countries are located east of the Red Sea and are home to some 
of the world’s largest and most important natural resources, including oil. This means a 
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successful Shi’a Crescent has the potential to control the entire region and, through its 
control of oil and other resources, would play an essential role in altering the world’s 
dynamics.  
A. THE ORIGIN OF THE SHI’A–SUNNI CONFLICT 
The Shi’a–Sunni conflict originated from a division in the Muslim community 
about succession. When Prophet Mohamad received the first message from Gabriel, it 
was his immediate family, his wife Khadija and his cousin Ali and his best friend Abu 
Bakr who were among the first ten people to believe him. Abu Bakr was Mohammad’s 
confidante and best friend for many years. He accompanied him in spreading Islam in 
Medina, and filled in for him in leading public prayers when Mohamad was extremely ill. 
Ali was also a strong believer in Mohamad. He was Mohamad’s cousin, son-in-law, and 
the father of his grandchildren. Upon the death of Mohamad, there was a division in the 
Muslim community regarding who should be the Prophet’s successor: Ali’s followers and 
loyalists had strong beliefs that the next caliph must be a blood relative to the Prophet, 
whereas others felt more secure about Abu Bakr. 
The outcome of this difference became the two main Muslim sects: Sunni and 
Shi’a. Each sect developed characteristics that paved the way for a larger gap between the 
two. The Sunnis are those who continue to abide by what Prophet Mohamad did and said 
in regard to matters of life; the Shi’a believe that the Qur’an never dies and therefore 
should be the source to refer to about matters of life. When many Muslims voted for Abu 
Bakr as the Prophet’s successor, it was the first time the Shi’a felt they were unfairly 
treated. This became especially true when Abu Bakr recommended someone other than 
Ali to be the next caliph after his death. Since then, with the exception of Iran, the Middle 
East has been primarily ruled by Sunnis, who were often oppressive to the Shi’a.  
As a result of this oppression and resentment, Shi’a rituals became symbolic 
representations of their religious beliefs and cultural identity, which they had been 
protecting for centuries. For most Shi’a, Ashoura and Husseinya rituals are significant. A 
person is not considered Shi’a unless he or she practices and values these rituals. 
However, to most of the Arab Islamic countries, these rituals are often viewed as extreme 
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and unorthodox. As a result, the Shi’a seem to struggle to gain acceptance and 
recognition in these primarily Sunni-governed countries. Vali Nasr, in his book The Shi’a 
Revival,3 examines the struggle behind the current Shi’a–Sunni conflict and the Shi’a’s 
aim to rise and assert themselves in the region and to be accepted by the Western world.  
Despite the Shi’a’s religious beliefs, they do not shy away from helping and 
cooperating with Sunni-led governments. In fact, they typically display a great sense of 
nationalism and loyalty. Nasr points out, for instance, several incidents in which Shi’as 
fought for their Sunni-led nations and Sunni brethren against foreign threats, including in 
the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, and, in the case of Iraqi Shi’a especially, the first Gulf War. 
In spite of Shi’a’s loyalty, national pride, and their willingness to defend, they still have 
not been recognized or politically represented. Instead, they are often referred to in a 
derogatory way as “Farsi” and non-Arabs, accusing them of close ties to the Iranian 
radicals.  
In spite of the continued Shi’a struggle to be accepted by other Arab Muslims and 
their failed advances to be recognized by the Western world, they have achieved 
remarkable successes in protecting their identity, history, and lineage as successors of 
Islam since the early division of the religion. These achievements, although they 
demonstrate a great sense of strength and character, have sometimes proven to be 
disadvantageous for the Shi’a quest. The Sunnis viewed this strong Shi’a bond as a threat 
to their own identity, and, perhaps, existence. This fear is not completely unjustified 
because the long-oppressed Shi’a may still be clamoring for the chance to overturn the 
Sunni governments. Nasr foresees a major turning point in the political future of the 
region as a consequence of the ongoing division. He believes that the Shi’a are certainly 
on a quest to gain more power in the region and, someday, to possibly rule it. This 
scenario would cause a major shift of power and destabilization in the region and 
therefore would require the United States to make drastic changes to its foreign policy. 
See Figure 1. 
                                                 
3 Vali Nasr, The Shi'a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York, NY: 
W.W Norton & Company, Inc., 2007). 
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*Map has been modified to include a symbol (added by author) to demonstrate 
the Crescent’s physical location. 
Figure 1.  The Potential Shi’a Crescent: Iran, Iraq (South), and Lebanon (East)4 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The possibility of a Shi’a Crescent, or a Shi’a revival, raises two questions: 1) Do 
Shi’a in all three countries have enough commonalities to form a union? For instance, are 
Shi’a socioeconomic and sociopolitical standings sufficient grounds for a unification of 
Shi’a identity? 2) What dependent and independent variables can lead to or hinder the 
                                                 




success of this unification? How can internal and external affairs play a role in shaping 
this unification? These questions highlight concerns on a regional level.  
C. IMPORTANCE  
The United States needs to understand the possibility of a Shi’a empowerment 
because it creates opportunities for the United States in the region’s politics. The 
importance of considering the Shi’a aim in achieving power and influence in the Middle 
East is perhaps best described by Nasr, who argues that the United States would have 
succeeded in Iraq had it given the Shi’a a chance to cooperate. Instead, because of fear 
and lack of trust, the United States did not provide any support to Iraqi Shi’a against their 
oppressive government.  
Nasr warns of the military advantages of the Shi’a, which may lead to overturning 
of Sunni governments, and sees a major turning point in the political future of the region. 
Iran’s strong military forces withstood a long and hard-fought war against Western-
supported Iraq and are very capable of supporting Hezbollah through military training 
and/or equipment. Iran can also provide Hezbollah financial assistance thanks to its large 
production of oil and other resources.  
The purpose of the thesis is to examine and analyze the strength of commonalities 
among the Shi’a, including socioeconomic settings, identity, and military power, in the 
three Crescent-associated countries, and their capability or incapability of forming a 
unified power.  
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
In conducting the research for this paper, it is evident that Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon 
have fewer common factors than what appears on the surface. In reality, the Shi’a 
community in these countries has a different motive to rise. In Iran, the motive is 
expansion of the Shi’a Persian Empire, more so as a defensive mechanism against foreign 
(Western) threats; in Iraq, the motive is to achieve governmental power and enhance 
socioeconomic status, whereas in Lebanon, Shi’a are in need of more recognition, 
representation, and education.  
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The hypothesis of this paper foresees separate Shi’a revivals in each of the three 
countries, and not necessarily on the regional level. In fact, the current revival is only 
gaining added attention because these uprisings are occurring at about the same or within 
a short period of each other. However, there is no evidence that these movements 
continue to evolve after achieving their initial goals domestically. In other words, once 
the Shi’a in both Iraq and Lebanon have reached their target goals, it is unlikely they will 
act as a unified people and influence or impact the rest of the region.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As ground-breaking as the idea of a unified Shi’a Crescent may be, there are 
several studies that have counter-argued and dismissed this notion. Many of the material 
written about this subject are full of controversy, making it essential to examine and 
carefully research the available texts and evidence.  
By far, most of the literature that examines Shi’a focuses on the transitional 
socioeconomic and political transformations within each of the three Crescent-
representing countries. Numerous texts and publications support the notion of acceptance 
of Shi’a within predominantly populated Sunni regions and governments.  
In the book, Shi’asm, Resistance, and Revolution,5 Kramer reviews the history of 
Shi’asm and the role of the Shi’a’s main clerics known as Marja’. He defines the Marja’ 
as: “an institution that reproduces itself through the sometime harsh factional struggles 
regularly opposing contenders for religious authority.” Evidently, main heads of the sect 
were initially aiming to influence the area spanning Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) 
extending to Jabal Lebanon (south of Lebanon). He points out periods in history where 
Shi’a had succeeded, to a certain extent, in reaching their goals. For instance, the author 
examines the Safavid Empire of modern Iran and its social, political, and economic 
achievements. The Safavid used their success in educating Shi’a within the Empire and 
the surrounding areas, according to Kramer’s quote of Arjomand on page 70, “With the 
establishment of the Safavid Dynasty (1501–1722) in Iran and the subsequent 
                                                 
5 Kramer, M. (Ed.), Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution. (London, England: Mansell Publishing 
Limited, 1987) 88. 
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transformation of Shi’asm into the Iranian state religion, Iran became the main center of 
Shia learning, attracting many of the most qualified scholars of the Shi’a world.”6 This 
had marked Iran as the Shi’a center during that time, which may have contributed to the 
Iranian influence on the Shi’a community from then until today.  
In addition, Kramer highlights the significant role of Marj’a, particularly in 
Lebanon, albeit as less of a religious entity and more of a political one. In fact, when 
Kramer speaks of the Shi’a community in Lebanon, he does not see a direct correlation of 
the Shi’a’s current situation to its improved economic status. Instead, he relates the 
Lebanese Shi’a’s past shortcomings to the lack of political representation among a 
multisectarian population in a country, such as Lebanon, which has strong political 
representation for all other sects except the Shi’a.  
Furthermore, Kramer, like many other authors and experts on the topic, has 
agreed that Shi’a in the entire Gulf region, which he refers to as the center for Shi’a, have 
been neglected on both the political and economic fronts. This negligence has been 
ongoing since Prophet Mohamad’s death, whereas research and writings on the Shi’a 
dilemma in the region did not start to draw attention until after the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran in 1979.  
Graham Fuller and Fracke Rend Rahim see Shi’a as victims of the successive 
governments in the region, indicating that “The Shi’a point to a pattern of negligence and 
poverty resulting from discriminatory practices of governments from Ottoman times into 
the modern era.”7 These perpetual discriminations against Shi’a have left them with the 
sense of victimization and leading them to seek self-worth through protection of their 
identity. Fuller and Rahim continue: “Reinforcing the cultural-religious dimension of 
Shi’ate identity is their social identification as the poor and uneducated, the underclass of 
the Arab world stretching from south Lebanon to Bahrain.”8 However, in response to the 
significantly active role of Shi’a in Bahrain highlighted by Kramer, Fuller and Rahim 
                                                 
6 Kramer, Shi’asm, Resistance, and Revolution, 70. 
7 Graham E. Fuller and Francke R. Rahim, The Arab Shi'a the Forgotten Muslims (New York, NY: St. 
Martin Press, 1999), 19. 
8 Ibid., 241. 
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argue that Shi’a in Iran and Lebanon are more dissatisfied with the Western world and 
the United States than are Shi’a in Bahrain and other Gulf countries, “Of all the Shi’ate 
communities in the Gulf and the Arab world, it is perhaps the Iranian and Lebanese Shi’a 
who have grounds for the greatest grievances toward the West.”9 
Throughout his writing, Kramer points out that Shi’a in Bahrain are not 
particularly regarded as more important or less rebellious than those in Iran, Iraq, and 
Lebanon. In fact, he continuously reminds us of the few occasions in which Shi’a in 
Bahrain protested against their ruling governments. Shi’a revolutions and rebellion 
against their own governments are not only caused by their respective state’s negligence, 
but also in part by the negligence and consolation of the Shi’a continue to receive from 
Western governments and the United States—especially when their ruling governments 
are supported by the West. Therefore, in addition to their non-Shi’a governments, the 
Shi’a’s hostility, ill-will, and grudges are very often directed against the Western world 
and the United States. 
Shi’ism has had deeper roots within the Iranian society since the success of the 
Safavids. The Safavid Empire is described, by more than one author, as one of the most 
fertile eras in Iran’s history, especially on the Shi’a political authority front. The 
establishment of many educational institutes and the blooming of textiles provided Iran’s 
Shi’a with great enthusiasm that instilled will and confidence in them to aim for political 
authority. Cole and Keddie10 state that upheavals and the Islamic revolution placed Iran 
in the spotlight of the international community, which did not welcome such a revolution, 
especially when it succeeded without the need of any foreign aid: “The Iranian 
Revolution was therefore atypical not only in its internal revolution but also in its 
apparent detachment from the broader international context within which Iran found itself 
and which played such an important role in most other revolutions.”11 Nevertheless, once 
the Islamic Republic of Iran was established, the Iranian authorities have been seeking to 
expand their ideologies outside Iran, according to Cole and Keddie, “Since 1979, the 
                                                 
9 Fuller and Rahim, The Arab Shi'a the Forgotten Muslims, 241. 
10 Cole, J. R., Shi'ism and Social Protest. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), 1986. 
11 Ibid., 139. 
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Iranian government has announced numerous measures of support for Muslim groups 
struggling abroad against oppressive governments.”12 
The case of Shi’a revolts and government dominance in Iran differs completely 
from the Shi’a scenario in Iraq. These differences can be outlined in two categories: The 
influence of religious institutes and the tribal social structure of the Iraqi society. Unlike 
Shi’a in Iran, the Iraqi Shi’a have been historically regarded as second-class citizens, both 
academically and socioeconomically. They have been excluded from high-profile official 
positions in the government and the Iraqi armed forces until recent years. Even then, their 
inclusion was met with challenges. Although Iran may be considered the center of Shi’a 
in the region from a political power and influence prospective, Iraq represents the center 
of Shi’a Marja’ and pilgrimage for many Shi’a of different countries in the region. This is 
because Iraq has the Shi’a’s most important shrines, which are primarily located in Iraq’s 
central provinces of Najaf and Kurbala. Early Shi’a scholars and Marja’ had established 
religious educational institutes and centers that taught scholars about Islam and Shari’a 
law from the Shi’a prospective. This religious influence’s establishment in the region 
created a threat to the successive governments of Iraq. Because the majority of the Shi’a 
scholars come to Iraq from or through Iran, the Iraqi ruling governments had isolated the 
Shi’a in society, often accusing them of loyalty to Iran and disloyalty to Iraq despite a 
lack of evidence. In fact, antagonism caused a gap between Iranian and Iraqi Shi’a for 
many. Ironically, as stated by numerous authors, it was not until the Ba’athist rule in Iraq 
that the close relationship between Iranian and Iraqi Shi’a scholars improved primarily 
from political reasons. Eventually, the network between the two populations has grown as 
a result of exiled Iraqi ‘ulama entering Iran and Iranian Shi’a envoys and scholars 
continuing their religious education in Iraq: “In October 1965 the Arif government 
allowed the exile Iranian ayatollah, Ruhullah Khomeini, to come to Iraq to live and teach. 
Ayatollah Khomeini attempted to woo Najaf’s senior ‘ulama into political action against 
the Shah of Iran but got a frosty response from Ayatollah al-Hakim and hence from other 
Iraqi ‘ulama.”13  
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Shi’a in Lebanon did not suffer from the second-class citizen classification to the 
same extent as those in Iraq did, per se. The negligence encountered by the Lebanese 
Shi’a was not intended to directly cause their Shi’a; rather, their struggle was mainly the 
result of their passive role in the country’s politics. Therefore, the Shi’a in Lebanon have 
been more in need of an active political representation, which it lacked primarily for two 
reasons. First the occupation of Lebanon by external powers, such as the Ottomans, who 
are Sunnis, decreased the possibility for Shi’a to be directly involved in politics. In 
addition, the French favored the Maronite Christians: “The Maronite Christians, who had 
been the strongest group in the previous regime in Mount Lebanon, remained the 
strongest local group in Greater Lebanon. The major threat to the new French-backed 
regime emanated from the Sunnis of the coast, who agitated to resume their previous 
links with the Syrian interior.”14 Second, the Lebanese Shi’a remained passive in the 
political arena. As a result, “The two groups of Lebanese Shi’a took little part in the 
events that led to the establishment of a new, [inter-sectarian] political system in the 
central parts of Mount Lebanon from 1585 on.”15 
Consequently, when Musa al-Sadr came to Lebanon in 1959 to become the new 
Lebanese Mufti (religious expert and authority who issues fatwas), the Lebanese Shi’a 
community rapidly responded to his desire to improve their role in Lebanese society and 
politics. Al-Sadr’s first step was to underline the significance of education among the 
Shi’a community in an effort to increase their self-confidence: “He [al-Sadr] generated a 
sense of indignation among the community about their lowly position in Lebanese society 
and stimulated the belief that they could indeed do something about it through non-
revolutionary political action.”16 This new attitude gradually led to the establishment of 
Amal and later Hezbollah.  
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F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The method employed in conducting the research for this paper will be a 
comparative multiple case study. The qualitative method is essential in conducting the 
study to analyze motives and patterns of behavior in each country. The study will focus 
on one particular time frame, the twentieth century, which provides eminent and 
numerous pieces of evidence of the contemporary socioeconomic and political challenges 
as well as military changes in the countries being studied and the entire region.  
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
By tracing all of these factors, we can explain that the declaration of a Shi’a 
Crescent is simply intended to put the international community’s awareness on high alert 
and raise attentiveness to the critical situation facing Jordan, especially considering its 
geographical location. It does not necessarily infer a true shift of power and dominance, 
or even a threat, in the region. 
Many researchers have agreed that, throughout history, Shi’as were suppressed by 
successive ruling governments in the region, and, therefore, they will stop taking the 
opportunity to rise. In fact, Nasr indicates that the Safavid Empire aimed at expanding the 
empire to include modern Iraq.17 However, Faleh Jabar18 reveals in his book that Shi’as 
were excluded from governmental positions, better education systems, and higher wages 
in Iraq for a long time. Augustus Norton agrees with Faleh in the latter’s assessment of 
the Shi’a history in Lebanon; he19 sees the Lebanese government’s negligence of 
Lebanese Shi’a encouraged the development of the Amal Movement and Hezbollah. 
King Abdullah of Jordan’s declaration of a Shi’a Crescent formation is still vague, 
regardless of whether the collective Shi’a rise is a form of revenge against Arab- and 
Sunni-led governments. Brenda Shaffer20 suggests that there are challenges ahead if such 
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a formation were to take place; but she too fails to analyze what would have led to King 
Abdullah II’s declaration and his perception of a possible Shi’a Crescent.  
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II. IRAQ 
The Shi’a revival and government takeover in Iraq was an unexpected, yet major 
shift in the region’s politics. It has changed the dynamics of main powers, lit up, once 
again, a sectarian conflict that has been buried for centuries, and challenged the region’s 
economy. But, it was inevitable that if the Shi’a were to revive, it would be the Iraqi 
Shi’a who would start it, for they have been the most oppressed. They have been 
deprived of equality on many levels: politically, economically, and educationally. The 
lasting oppression by Iraqi and foreign occupiers’ governments was due to fear of the 
Iraqi Shi’a’s loyalty to Iran. Are political and socioeconomic deprivation, and the Shi’a 
identity, sufficient factors to convince Shi’a in Iraq to unify with other Shi’as in the 
region? This chapter examines the Shi’a in Iraq regarding political consideration, 
socioeconomic status, and that country’s perspective on the Shi’a identity during three 
major political eras: before Ba’ath rule, under Saddam’s rule, and after Saddam’s rule. 
Iraqi Shi’a only became a threat to governments in early 1920s. It is unknown 
whether their early actions were merely defensive and as tools for liberating Iraq from 
foreign occupation and suppressive government, or, whether these justifications were a 
method to pave the way for possible unified Shi’a influence and authority. Regardless of 
the true motives, the consequences of such periodic upheaval remain applicable until 
today. Shi’a in Iraq were suppressed on different political and socioeconomically levels, 
which eventually led to fewer educational opportunities as well. Iraqi Shi’a often 
encountered suspicions by fellow citizens and government leaders. Their initial rebellion, 
led by the Mujtahids (Muslim jurists), raised skepticism toward the true fidelity of the 
Iraqi Shi’a after their association with Iranian Mujtahids, in addition to the long religious 
conflict between Shi’as and Sunnis. Therefore, subsequent ruling governments of Iraq, 
whether national governments or foreign occupations, have always seen Iraqi Shi’a as a 
serious threat for coups. Thus, despite the many various ruling governments in Iraq 
within the past century and a half, the Shi’a were neglected, isolated, and rarely trusted.  
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A. IRAQI SHI’A PRE-BA’ATH PARTY (1900–1968) 
This section deals with the period between 1900 and 1968, during which Iraq had 
two successive occupations: the Ottomans and the British. During this time, the Iraqi 
Shi’a were experiencing an inequality of political representation and socioeconomic 
status, and they struggled to maintain Iraqi nationalism. 
The Ottomans, who were Sunnis, divided Iraq into regions in 1875, during their 
last few decades in the country, decentralized the government, challenged Iraqi 
nationalism, and politically discriminated against Shi’a. Before the Ottoman rule, Iraq 
was governed by its many tribes through one main representative for each, who served as 
the head of the tribe or Shaykh. The Shaykhs still played a major role during the Ottoman 
conquest of Iraq. The Turks selected and appointed heads of government in three major 
provinces, dividing Iraq into three regional areas: north, middle, and south. So, Iraq 
during the Ottoman rule was ruled by regional governments that were not linked or 
connected to a centralized government that considered and ruled Iraq as a whole. 
Therefore, it was more like three small separate states rather than one country: Mosul in 
the north, Baghdad in the middle, and Basra in the south. The regional governor’s main 
concern, although he did not belong to a centralized government, was to stay in power 
and keep his appointees (the Ottomans) satisfied. This regional division also divided Iraq 
religiously (into Sunni–Shi’a and Christians demographics) and sociolinguistic ally (Iraqi 
subdialects, Kurdish and Turkish). The decentralization of the government and regional 
division of ethno-religious populations threatened the Iraqi nationalism. It was also 
during this period that Iraqi Shi’a witnessed the first form of political discrimination 
because they were not considered regional Shaykhs. 
The Ottoman division of Iraq into regions led to social isolation of the Shi’a and 
hindered them economically. The Shi’a’s lifestyle had been relatively secure 
economically, but the new system cut them off culturally from education and 
advancement. The Shi’a long-time practice of farming granted them the opportunity for 
agricultural expansion. Sluglett describes that the Ottomans had little control over lands, 
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because they were protected by tribes.21 In the meantime, the flourishing economy and 
literature occurring in Iraq and elsewhere in the region excluded Iraqi Shi’a. According to 
the Ottomans, the Shi’a profession of farming did not require education. Furthermore, 
these rural areas, which brought a great deal of revenue to the Ottoman rulers in Iraq, 
lacked civil services, including schools, hospitals, and mosques. Rural areas were mainly 
populated by Shi’a. The constant neglect and isolation of these communities led to the 
Shi’a to develop their own cultural habits and traditions and become disconnected from 
urban services and lifestyle.  
The new economic development appealed to the British, who started showing an 
interest in Iraq, particularly Basra, as a port for their merchants and merchandise from 
and into India. When the British conquered Basra in 1914, the Ottomans withdrew from 
Iraq, leaving it to British rule. After the British occupation, it was the Shi’a who first 
raised concern about a sovereign and independent Iraq; they especially regarded the non-
Islamic occupancy of their country as a threat to their faith and identity. Being occupied 
by non-Islamic elevated the desire for Iraq independence. In 1920, Shi’a and Sunnis 
aimed to unify, for the first time, to fight against the British; and they succeeded, 
although such unity was not long-lasting: “By late July much of the mid Euphrates region 
was in the hands of the rebels. This set-back for British control gave heart to others to 
revolt….”22 
This revolution was perceived as a threat in many ways: first, the British did not 
expect the rebellion to start from Najaf and Karbala—south provinces of Iraq—and to 
extend to Baghdad. Second, the Sunnis sensed a Shi’a threat because the call to rebel 
against the British was initiated by Shi’a Mujtahids and started in Najaf and Karbala, the 
two Shi’a shrine cities in Iraq. Third, the Shi’a leaders in the Kut and ‘Amara provinces 
opposed the revolution and worked “against it.”23 These leaders were the beneficiaries of 
British rule in Iraq. This revolution was, or seemed to be, the first opportunity for Iraqi 
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Shi’a to form a centralized, powerful Shi’a authority in Iraq in accordance with Shi’ism 
theology. The main issue, aside from resistance from other groups, was the divergence 
among Shi’a soon after the death of their highest religious leader, Shirazi, in 1920. 
Another problem was the questioned legitimacy of Iraqi Mujtahids versus Iranian 
Mujtahids, who were supposedly in Iraq to support the Mujtahid mission. 
The gradual withdrawal of the British resulted in the crowning of King Faisal I in 
1921 to rule Iraq. He was first perceived by Iraqi Shi’a and Iraqi Mujtahids as a politician 
who would support and protect the Iraqi Shi’a against the British occupation and the 
Wahhabis, a conservative Muslim group.24 However, this perception was wrong. The 
King was alarmed by the Shi’a potential; therefore, his first act was to exile the Iraqi 
Mujtahids, in particular those of Iranian origin, and accuse them of loyalty to Iran rather 
than Iraq. In a struggle for religious power, the Mujtahids were forced to flee to Iran, and 
Iranian Mujtahids disputed certain religious aims and practices that were to be 
implemented for Shi’a practices. Some Mujtahids pled with the King to grant them a 
return to Iraq.  
The Shi’a were not as much of a threat and were not as strong as initially 
perceived. This became apparent through the division among the Mujtahids, who were 
considered the head of and served as a resource for the Shi’a followers, led to the 
weakening and disappointment of the Iraqi Shi’a community in 1921. Also, the Shi’a 
uluma (Muslim legal scholars) acknowledged that such a strong Shi’a unification 
between Iranian Mujtahids and Iraqi Shi’a was unlikely to happen at the time and 
identified obstacles or “weaknesses” that could hinder such a unification as “….ethnic, 
linguistic, and cultural.”25 Once the King was aware of these weaknesses, he changed his 
strategy toward the Shi’a, which led to a transformation in Shi’a–state relations. He 
granted the Iraqi Mujtahids, and Shi’a in general, positions in the government to give 
them a sense of authority, recognition, and, most importantly, to win them over and 
expand the gap between the Iraqi and Iranian Mujtahids.  
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Faisal then appointed a highly regarded clergyman, Muhamad Baqr-al-Sadr, to 
serve as a mediator between the Iraqi Shi’a and its government. Although the King 
granted Sadr a level of religious authority in the government, Sadr became almost the 
only religious authority for the Iraqi Shi’a. This decreased the authority of the sayyids, 
who were tribal counselors on marriages, divorces, and inheritances,26 and marked the 
success of the Sunni monarch in Iraq in separating the state from religious or radical 
religious views. This appointment of Sadr encouraged the Shi’a to be more flexible about 
their religious and political goals.  
The King was not only successful in laying out such a strategy, but also in 
selecting Sadr to hold this position. Sadr, while maintaining open-mindedness on Iraq’s 
policies that neglected the Shi’a, also won the hearts of many Iraqi Shi’a through his 
philosophical and religious writings; he became an idol to be followed to many Shi’a, 
according to Nakash: “al-Sadr was said to have been calm, deliberate, and sound in his 
judgments.”27 Also, he became the head of the Al-Da’wa party (some literature suggests 
that he founded the party), which was Islamic-based rather than political, and sought to 
establish an Islamic state. Its name in Arabic means “the call.” However, its structure and 
means of formation infer are interpreted differently. Sadr used his religious authority in 
the government to raise awareness of the significance of educating his fellow Shi’a. He 
became a respected person among Shi’a, and their admiration for his writings encouraged 
them to seek education. This popularity continued for two decades.  
Several countries in the Middle East during the 1950s witnessed a strong wave of 
nationalism and Arab-nationalist awakening. The rising of Nasserism—the following of 
Gamal Abdel Nasir—in Egypt led to the formation of the Ba’ath party in Syria and then 
Iraq; these movements were pan-Arab. Iraq, too, was drawn into this awakening. This 
marked a turning point in Iraq’s political history. These movements called for the 
overthrow of foreign occupiers and the expansion of communist ideology among Arabs. 
This permitted some secularism. In addition to the elevated level of education among 
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Iraqis, these factors set the stage for the first political coup in Iraq. The coup was led by 
officers, among them Shi’a, who ended the kingdom and announced Iraq as a new 
republic in 1958. Slugett describes this moment as follows: “Qasim and ‘Arif appeared 
on television ….. and declared that a popular government under a republic would be 
inaugurated and called for maintenance of order and unity…..[m]artial law was declared 
a few hours later.”28 In the years that followed, the region, including Iraq, struggled to 
assert itself nationally and religiously in its battle against communism. During this time, 
extremist religious formations were born throughout the region; Da’wa formed in Iraq 
during the early 1960s.  
B. THE SHI’A TRAPPED UNDER THE BA’ATHISTS’ AND SADDAM’S 
GOVERNANCE 
During the period between 1978 and 2003, Shi’a in Iraq experienced severe 
political oppression under the Ba’athist and Saddam Hussein’s governments. During this 
period, the Iraq-Iran War intensified Shi’a–state relations and Saddam legislated banning 
of Shi’a celebrations. This led to a Shi’a resistance and uprising in 1991. 
This section discusses the fear of the Ba’ath party of a Shi’a coup, the role of Iran, 
and the Shi’a attempt to stage a coup against Saddam. The Ba’ath party came to govern 
Iraq in late 1968, and the status of the Shi’a was at stake. Despite the Ba’ath’s slogan that 
called for unity in the nation, Ba’athist leaders seemed threatened by the organized Shi’a 
community, despite it being loyal and dedicated to Iraq’s two intellectual scholars: 
Ayatollah al- Sadr and Ayatollah al-Hakim.  
The success of Shi’a social development, especially in building educational 
institutions in a short time, drew Ba’athist attention. For more than a decade, Iraqi Shi’a 
had succeeded in building primary and secondary education schools and a few institutes 
that specialized in teaching Shi’a theology that welcomed foreign students. The Ba’athist 
opposition to the Shi’a’s institutions began by closing the schools, preventing the 
building of a university planned in Kufa (south of Iraq), forbidding foreign students from 
attending Shi’a schools, and forcing Iraqis who were attending these schools to enlist in 
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the Iraqi military.29 At this point it was clear to the Shi’a leaders that the new government 
was working against them. So, the leaders, Sadr and Hakim, decided to split the duties in 
raising awareness among their fellow Shi’a. While Hakim resided in Kadhimiya in 
Baghdad, where the shrine of Kadhim, a Shi’a imam, is and mostly populated by Shi’a, 
Sadr went to Lebanon to ask for foreign help from other Islamic nations and mostly the 
“Shi’a supreme council headed by his cousin Musa al-Sadr [in Lebanon] to campaign 
against the Iraqi government.”30 Ironically, only four Islamic countries responded to the 
call “on moral grounds,” and only one of those has a Shi’a majority among its populous. 
Iran was not one of the supporting nations.  
A social movement that spread throughout Baghdad’s neighborhoods, especially 
Shi’a districts, had alerted the ruling party of the potential of a Shi’a coup. However, 
when Shi’a leaders organized these movements, they were not aiming at or planning a 
coup against the Ba’athists—at least there is not enough evidence suggesting such a plot. 
Their main aim was to rebel against the British presence. The Ba’athists’ tactic next was 
to weaken the Da’wa party because it was religious and more sectarian focused. The 
Ba’athists accused Da’awa members of being loyal to and affiliated with Iran; as a result, 
Ba’athists executed some Da’wa members and its scholars. Sadr did not give up, instead 
continuing with his enthusiasm toward educating the Shi’a community. By publishing his 
work “al-fatwa al-wahida,” he received more admiration from the Shi’a and was regarded 
as their leader.31 Soon, Ba’athists tried to ban Hussainya processions, Shi’a rituals 
mourning the death of the Prophet’s cousins that is held annually by millions of Shi’a 
both inside and outside Iraq. This ban confirmed Ba’athist discrimination against Shi’a, 
and Sadr issued a fatwa against joining the Ba’ath party. 
Iraqi provinces and neighborhoods that were mostly populated by Shi’a resisted 
the Ba’athists attempts to end Shi’a celebrations. Areas like Najaf, Kurbala, Kut, 
Nassryia (south of Iraq), and Thawra City in Baghdad resumed the annual processions 
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despite all forms of harassment by the Ba’athists. This created tension between the 
Ba’thists’ government and the Shi’a, and led to a disconnection between these cities and 
the rest of Iraq. By late 1970s, a great deal of tension had built up between the Shi’a 
community, its leadership, and the Ba’athists; hundreds of Shi’a were executed by order 
of courts, and Sadr was kept under house arrest.32 The religious leader Ruhullah 
Khomeini in Iran sent messages to Sadr encouraging him to stay in Najaf and applauded 
his leadership for the Shi’a community in Iraq; these communications were used by the 
Ba’athists to convince Iraqis of Sadr’s disloyalty to Iraq and faithfulness to Iran. In fact, 
Khomaini received his education in Islamic studies and Shi’a theology and received his 
religious rank by advancing his studies in the city in Najaf, where he resided of a number 
of years; he thus held strong attachment to these cities and his Iraqi Shi’a scholars.  
The Ba’ath’s hostilities even reached top Shi’a clerics in Iraq by being sent into 
exile or being murdered. Any Iraqi citizen that had ties with either Iran or active Shi’a 
members were also targeted. When al-Hakim fled to Iran, Sadr was secretly executed by 
Saddam’s regime in 1980. The news of his death was broadcast to Iraqis by Khomeini, 
who also delivered a message to all Iraqis to depose the government; this caused great 
grief and resentfulness in the Shi’a toward the Iraqi government. By now, the Shi’a 
community had no religious leader and Saddam’s regime continued its efforts to wipe out 
the Da’wa party. The regime succeeded in its mission against the Da’wa party by killing 
thousands of its active members and supporters in the early 1980s and deploying more 
than 130,000 Iraqi nationals of Iranian origin to Iran.33 After the Iraq-Iran War started, 
Saddam’s regime encouraged Iraqi men who were married to Iranian women to divorce 
their wives for a sum of money. The regime also sent Shi’a, along with other Iraqi sects, 
to fight the Iranians to protect—although it was more likely meant to “prove”—their 
“Arab identity;” planted secret service informants in Shi’a neighborhoods, shrines, and 
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places of prayers and lectures; and degraded the status of ‘ulama by considering them 
employees instead of holy men.34 
It is likely that Saddam, by employing ‘ulama, wanted to control their religious 
addresses and lectures and hence prevent any possible attempts to organize for the 
overthrow of government. Shi’a community was completely repressed by the regime 
within the first two years of the Iraq-Iran War. During the eight years of war, the regime 
kept a closer eye on the Shi’a population; they are Iraq’s majority population and 
therefore of its armed forces, yet, officers of these forces were dominantly Sunnis: “[A] 
growing number of Shi’a officers were promoted to positions of prestige and 
responsibility in which they demonstrated their competence and loyalty in the war against 
Iran.”35 This, however, created a division in regard to social, economic, and educational 
levels between urban and rural Shi’a, who remained neglected by the government. This 
was especially true of those living in the marshlands and the Shatt-el-Arab area, which 
were frontiers of many battles during the Iraq-Iran War because of their strategically 
critical border locations and the nature of their geology, which made battle difficult. 
Drying of the marshlands in 1991 out of fear of a possible Shi’a uprising against the 
government had negatively impacted the Shi’a and added to their tension against the 
government; the Shi’a most likely felt betrayed because they had fought in the war 
against Iran but once the war was over Saddam’s government returned to its original 
persecution of them.  
The suppression of the 1991 Shi’a uprising in Iraq brought Shi’a–Saddam’s 
regime relations to a climax that could not be forgotten by either side. As mentioned 
previously, Saddam’s retaliation against the Shi’a was to dry the marshlands located 
southeast of Iraq between Iraq and Iran and populated by Shi’a. The marshlands were not 
only a home for its inhabitants, but also their source of food; they knew the marshlands 
and knew them well. Because Shi’a native of the marshlands supplied their own food by 
raising and hunting livestock, they found themselves having no choice but to flee what 
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became arid lands. Their departure to nearby cities did not serve them; rather, it became a 
struggle for them and the residents of these areas: “In the marshes, they had neither 
school nor hospital. None of them had university diploma or a profession….they had a 
very hard time assimilating, and many became involved in theft and brawls.”36  
Iraqi Shi’a may have miscalculated when selecting the time of their uprising to be 
right after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; the Arab region was too mad to grant support and 
Iran had just come out of a long war. Shi’a, who knew that Saddam’s regime was too 
infiltrated among the people for them to plot any action—and therefore relied on external 
assistance from neighboring countries and international alliance—did not consider that 
neighboring countries, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Egypt, disliked 
Shi’a as well and were not going to support another enemy just to defeat Saddam, who in 
any case seemed to them defeated at that time. Iraqi Shi’a again felt betrayed and isolated 
by their own nation and Arabs. In fact, Egypt’s former President Hosni Mubarak had 
made a statement to a television channel accusing Shi’a, in general, of being loyal to 
Iran.37 It was evident that Saddam had tried to prove to Iraqi Shi’a that, without his 
government, they are unable to function and be live independently in Iraq. 
But this did not mean that while Saddam was ruling as a complete dictator that he 
was completely successful in containing all Shi’a opposition and movements. In fact, in 
addition to the southern provinces in Iraq, which are mostly populated by Shi’a because 
of major Shi’a Imams and Prophet’s family members living there, Saddam failed to 
contain a small district in Baghdad called Thawra City. Not only was this district Shi’a-
populated, but its residents were also adherent to their Shi’a identity, beliefs, and rituals. 
These features made that district the most neglected in Baghdad in terms of civil services 
and education. Saddam’s hope of controlling and causing these Shi’a to denounce their 
true Shi’ism led to the opposite. Now, Saddam had a district that harbored a great 
resentment toward him, yet was a strong, close community because as all of its members 
had common struggles and sentiments against Saddam. Throughout the years, there were 
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exchanged maneuvers between Saddam’s security forces and Thawra City residents. This 
district was never contained by Saddam, and thus, it always left him with some fear of a 
coup by Shi’a against him. In fact, he even changed the name of the city from Thawra, 
which means “revolution,” to Saddam City.  
C. POST-SADDAM: CHALLENGES FOR IRAQI SHI’A CONTINUE 
The circumstances in Iraq had given Iraqi Shi’a time to reflect and prepare for a 
change in government, especially between 1991 and 2003, but they were not ready to 
rule. This section of the chapter highlights the division within the Iraqi Shi’a and the role 
of each party’s ideology, history, and association with non-Iraqi Shi’a plays. These 
parties include the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the 
Da’wa, and Sadr’s movement.  
Perhaps the time period between 1991 and 2003 for Iraq’s Shi’a was a time of 
reflection and preparation for an opportunity that it was inevitably waiting for: a coup or 
the fall of Saddam. Also, it may have deeply carved the Shi’as’ sentiments of resentment 
toward Saddam’s government, the Arabs, and possibly adding a new enemy, the United 
States. The fall of Saddam has not brought rest to Iraqi Shi’a, however, or at least, not 
yet. In fact, to a certain extent the period between 2003 until now has highlighted the 
dilemma of the power struggle and divergence amongst Shi’a. Although these differences 
seem to be mainly political and the religious practices and ranks have remained, to a great 
extent, the unifying factor of these different Shi’a parties in Iraq, as Terrill describes it, is 
“Competition for religious leadership in some cases political power, rapidly materialized 
among clerics as the posture situation unfold.”38 The following paragraphs examine the 
primary Iraqi Shi’a political parties and the circumstances associated with each that 
hinder the conclusion of a unified Shi’a structure in Iraq.  
1. SCIRI and the Badr Brigade 
The SCIRI seems to be the most balanced party of all the Shi’a parties in Iraq. 
Despite its highly trained militia by the Iranian Guards, the SCIRI proved to be capable 
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of playing the role of mediator between the American forces in Iraq and the resentment of 
the Iraqi people. Although the SCIRI continues to refer to the American forces as an 
occupying force, it has not issued a fatwa encouraging Iraqis to combat against the 
American and allied presence. Rather, the SCIRI has called for diplomatic and peaceful 
venues to end the occupancy: “SCIRI has continued to assert the importance of not 
combating the U.S. occupation forces with force until all political and diplomatic means 
for ending the occupation have been exhausted….and refer to Iraq resistance fighters as 
‘terrorists,’”39 because they also kill many Iraqi civilians in the process.  
However, although the SCIRI is diplomatic and moderate in its approach to 
politics, its stance during the Iran-Iraq War and its connection to Iran still stirs major 
confusion among Iraqis. While in Iran, the SCIRI maintained a good relationship with the 
Iranian government, received military training, and was able to broadcast from Iran 
against the Ba’athists in Iraq. However, during the First Gulf War, SCIRI then-leader, 
Ayatollah (the highest Shi’a religious rank) Mohamad al Hakim, had to flee to Iran 
because of “persecutions” by the Ba’athists against Shi’a scholars. Another downside to 
the previous cooperation between the SCIRI and Iran’s government was the 
establishment of the Badr Brigade, the SCIRI military force: “The Badr Brigades were 
originally recruited, trained, and equipped by Iran’s hardline force, the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC], during the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq war. The Corps 
consist of thousands of former Iraqi officers and soldiers who defected from the Iraqi 
army, Iraqi refugees, and Iraqis who fled the country and join SCIRI.”40 These former, 
yet serious, linkages with Iran means the SCIRI is perceived with skepticism by Iraqis, 
despite the SCIRI’s endless efforts to supposedly “de-militating” the Badr Brigade and 
distance itself and its politics from those of Iran’s. 
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2. Da’wa Party 
The Da’wa party is well-recognized among Iraqis for its long, brutal history with 
Saddam’s government, but it is also recognized for its extremism and bias with Iran. 
Because there has been a long association and military training by the Iranians Guards, its 
Iraqi loyalty is often questioned. Eventually, Saddam ordered every person who became a 
member of the Da’wa party to be persecuted; around 77,000 people were persecuted or 
killed in the battle against Saddam’s regime, according to the Da’wa.41 Others were 
harassed and sent into exile in Iran, which led to the establishment of the Da’wa party 
and its attempts to counter the rapid expansion of communism among Iraqis in late 
1950s. It was officially established in 1958 as a radical religious political party; having 
such an extreme motive made this resented not only by Saddam’s government but in all 
Iraqi governments since 1958.  
The brutality against this group of Shi’a continued to include various forms of 
harassment and discrimination, including the inability of Da’wa members to enlist in 
Iraqi military forces, attend certain colleges, and receive equal opportunity of 
employment and education. This included enrollment in theological institutions: “The 
harassment of the clergy escalated and led to the closure of previously flourishing 
theological institutes.”42 These discriminating policies forced Da’wa members to live in 
concentrations in Baghdad. Thawra City was one of the main clusters and it became, as 
mentioned previously, a main source of concern and trouble for Saddam. Led by 
Mohamad M. al Sadr, Da’wa was also influenced by the Iranian Revolution in 1978–
1979. Da’wa then started a series of attacks, although none was successful. As a result, 
Saddam ordered al Sadr and his older sons to be publically executed in 1979.  
The execution of al Sadr by Saddam forced Da’wa members to seek refuge in 
Iran. Al Sadr’s death echoed among his supporters of the Shi’a communities in Iraq, Iran, 
and Lebanon. Iran was very willing to provide shelter for Da’wa members to protect 
them, but also as a means of propaganda against Saddam’s regime: “Alongside members 
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of the SCIRI, Da’wa member also received intensive training from the Iranian army. 
What differentiates Da’wa from the SCIRI is their expansion through refuge in other 
neighboring tremendous pressure, Da’wa did take refuge in Iran, but it also established a 
presence in Syria, Lebanon and eventually Britain.”43 
Da’wa had more obstacles to presenting itself as a powerful national political 
body. Residing in different countries, and being limited in mobility and expression for 
those members who continued living in Iraq as fugitives, naturally caused the party to 
fracture. Among those factions was Iraq Hezbollah, which, not surprisingly, was 
influenced by the Lebanese Hezbollah leader and founder, Mohamed H. Fadlallah. 
Da’wa’s external influence by a religious-political party, such as Hezbollah, in addition 
to their ties to the Iranian government and clerics, although downplayed by Da’wa 
members, and the party’s extremist religious views made it challenging for the Da’wa 
party to win the public opinion and support and succeed in expansion influence over or 
holding a place in the government.  
3. Sadr Movement 
Sadr’s Movement is another Shi’a religious, political, and militia group that has 
struggled to prove itself as an efficient power to rule or decide for Iraq, mostly because of 
the weakness of its young, arrogant leader and his failure to establish networks in the 
region. Despite is strong presence since 2003 and its aggressive role in mainly fighting 
the U.S. forces in Iraq, this movement heavily relies on its historical fame. Muqtada al 
Sadr is the youngest son of Mohamad M. al Sadr, who was executed by Saddam, and the 
cousin of Ayatollah Musa al Sadr, founder of the Amal Movement in Lebanon who 
brought the Lebanese Shi’a to recognition and actualizing political power. This cavalier 
background made it easier for Muqtada al Sadr to start with a popular party filled with 
loyal supporters. He immediately he created a small group of militia called the al Mahdy 
Army, supposedly as a resistance force against the United States. In the same year, he left 
Iraq for Qum, Iran, to continue his theological studies. While trying to maintain a good 
rapport with many of Shi’a ayatollahs in Iraq as well as Iran, he has encountered much 
                                                 
43 Terrill, “The United States and Iraq's Shi'ite Clergy: Partners or Adversaries,” 24. 
 29 
resistance and doubt. Highly ranked Shi’a clergymen may have found Muqtada al Sadr to 
be motived by emotions and youth rather than religious and political wisdom: “Sadr is 
also known to be ruthless, and has been accused of being involved in the high profile 
murder of a returned Shi’a exile leader Abdul Majid al Kho’ei.”44 Such perceptions made 
Muqtada al Sadr more inclined to seek the support of Iran and its ayatollahs to prove 
himself. He affirmed his intention in adopting Iran’s concept of ruling to govern Iraq and 
make it an Islamic republic. Among the Iraqis, Muqtada al Sadr has failed to acquire any 
political position. Sadr and his army al Mahdi are blamed for inciting and being involved 
in violent acts against Sunnis; in fact, may have intentionally targeted or besieged some 
Sunni neighborhoods: “ His militia killed thousands of Iraqis and Western soldiers …..so 
the prospect of their resurgence frightens Iraqis (especially Sunnis) and Westerners 
alike.”45 Furthermore, Sadr’s efforts to maintain a close relationship with Ayatollah al 
Sistani, a nationalist Shi’a, and al Ha’iri, who has close ties with Iranian leaders—both 
are highly ranked and therefore highly regarded by many Shi’a—have countered his 
efforts to appear as an independent, nationalist, reliable leader. He is opposed in Iraq, 
Iran, and even Lebanon via Hezbollah. Aside from his hurdles in establishing a balance 
and asserting himself among the Shi’a community, he also seems to have suffered pitfalls 
regarding funding for his army.46 Regardless, al Sadr is still influential among Iraqi 
young men for his zealousness, and support from the youth who may emulate him for 
being a young, confrontational, and direct in his opposition to U.S. forces, in addition to 
his legendary family history in their dedication to Shi’asm.  
D. CONCLUSION 
It is unlikely that Iraqi Shi’a will become unified with Shi’a from another country 
for a number of reasons: they share the country with Sunnis and other religious and 
ethnic groups, they are too fragmented to form a unity within their own sect, and their 
historic associations with Iraq were the results of imposed circumstances.  
                                                 
44 Terrill, “The United States and Iraq's Shi'ite Clergy: Partners or Adversaries,” 17. 
45 The Economist, “Iraq's Clergyman: Muqtada al-Sadr, Back in Business,” May 5, 2011.  
46 Terrill, “The United States and Iraq's Shi'ite Clergy: Partners or Adversaries,” 21. 
 30 
The Shi’a struggle for power and control over Iraq prepared a civil war theater 
between the two dominant Muslim sects: the Sunnis and Shi’as. Bloody, violent activities 
bombarded Iraq in just about every province, although some were more violent than 
others. Being the largest sect residing Iraq, and due to their hunger for power and 
authority, the Shi’as surge came on too strong, with different policies and in different 
phases , including that the different Shi’a organizations each have their own well-trained 
militias. Sadr’s movement for instance acted in matters of authority and claimed 
governance before any legal, formal, or informal declaration of government: “Sadr’s 
Army and organization grew alarmingly in size, muscle and daring. In a Taliban-style for 
social power, they seized public buildings, beat up moderate professors, took over 
classrooms, forced women to wear the hijab, set up illegal sharia courts, and imposed 
their own brutal penalties.”47 The country’s demography was tolerant toward a sectarian 
violent break-out.  
The Sunnis’ awareness of Shi’a demographics prevents them from taking any 
uncalculated measures toward Iraq. The majority of Shi’a reside in Iraq’s southern 
provinces, and Iraq’s southern border also borders Iran. For Sunnis, who were enraged at 
losing their ideal ruler and supporter, Saddam, it is threatening the believe that: first, the 
Shi’a will take control of Iraq and retaliate thereafter; second, the Shi’a are armed and 
supported by Iran; and third, the United States will also support Iraqi Shi’a in organizing 
a proxy-war against Iran. Consequently, Sunnis, who populate the west and northwest 
Iraqi provinces, raced to arm as many as possible as a means of creating a frontier against 
Shi’a. Soon, al-Qaida and Wahhabi groups intervened and made the situation even worse. 
Since the toppling of the Saddam’s regime, Iraq has been on the verge of a civil war and 
sectarian violence continues daily.  
Another factor to be considered is that Iraqi Shi’a are unable to unify either their 
objectives or their policies regarding how to rule Iraq and win the trust of its citizens. In 
fact, their divergence into smaller groups and followers of certain clerics are just means 
of expressing their motive: power. Aside from the different factions of Iraqi Shi’a are 
                                                 
47 Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq? Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (2004): 40. 
 31 
secular Shi’a and Shi’a–Sunni intermarriages that populate large areas of Bagdad. Neither 
population is seeking to abide by a religious state or become a replica of Iran, although 
many of these two populations have sought refuge abroad because of the sectarian 
violence that occurred after 2003. The migration of secular groups and intermarriages 
among families allowed the migration of more extremist Shi’a to Baghdad from other 
provinces. Some Shi’a groups have been violent and even extreme in their religious 
beliefs. Moreover, the Shi’a loyalty to Iraq has been questioned by the former regime of 
Saddam, who often referred to Da’wa and Shi’a in general. This repeated allegation has 
stuck in the Iraqi citizens’ minds and may provide a basis for other minority ethnic and 
religious groups to justify their opposition to Shi’a ruling. At the same time, it has also 
brought questioning of Saddam’s plot to set the stage for a sectarian conflict after his 
departure. This put all Iraqi ethnic and religious-sectarian groups on alert for who will 
control Iraq and how will it protect the rights and ensure the equality of all Iraqis.  
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III. LEBANON 
The Shi’a in Lebanon share some aspects of neglect with the Shi’a in Iraq, but 
they also share political dynamics that would prevent them from forming a union with 
either Iraq or Iran. First, the Lebanese Shi’a are dependents of other foreign aid and 
influence. Like Iraqi Shi’a, they lack unified objectives, methodologies, and strategies. 
This chapter highlights the Lebanese Shi’a’s struggle to rise—socially, economically, and 
politically—without external support. The Lebanese Shi’a’s progressions are examined 
through three different periods of the country’s history: after the arrival of Sadr, the civil 
war era, and the birth of Hezbollah.  
The Lebanese rulers’ neglect of the Shi’a was not necessarily intentional, but had 
consequences. Some circumstances that prevented the Shi’a from achieving recognition 
included foreign occupation, external influences, and inter-sectarian conflicts. Lebanon’s 
geographical and demographical demarcation also played a role in isolating the Shi’a 
community. This chapter examines why the Iranian Shi’a, represented by Amal and 
Hezbollah, are too dependent and unlikely to unify with Shi’a in either Iraq or Iran.  
 Lebanon’s then new borders, as demarked by the Sykes Picot Agreement,48 created 
domestic and regional complications for the country. The agreement led to the demarcation 
of Lebanon’s borders. Since its creation and division from Balad al-Sham (the states of 
Levant),49 Lebanon was intentionally designed to be a fragile state and to serve as bridge for 
access at times of conflict in the region—especially those that rose between France and 
Britain as occupiers the Middle East in the early twentieth century. Not only did the Sykes-
Picot Agreement separate Lebanon from modern-day Syria, it also was not created 
geographically to become a wealthy country as far as resources are concerned. Another factor 
that led to a feeble Lebanon was its ethnic proportions. Muslims and Christians almost divide 
the country’s demographic in half; nevertheless, each religious group contains many sects. 
Table 1 indicates the various inter-sectarian groups.  
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Table 1.   Lebanon’s Sectarian Groups as of February 201450 
Muslim population and sects Christian population and sects 
59.7% 39% 
Sunni Maronite Catholic 
Shi’a Greek Orthodox 
Druze Melkite Catholic 
Isma’ilite Armenian Orthodox 






In 1926, it became imperative to write a Lebanese constitution, which was done 
and implemented in the same year. It acknowledged the necessity of all sects to coexist in 
order to unify and keep Lebanon as one country. Most Arab countries that had their 
constitution written at that time were under some foreign influence: the British, French, 
or Ottomans. Therefore, like any other constitution written under such political control, 
the Lebanese constitution, too, lacked the ability to determine or specify coexistence in 
terms of governance, demographic distributions, and representation of its ethnic groups. 
The constitution seemed to serve Lebanon, however, or may have allowed Lebanon to 
survive with domestic instability while under the occupation of the French until 1943.  
Once the French withdrew from Lebanon, inter-sectarian issues started to surface. 
Shortly after Lebanon received its independence from France, the Lebanese National Pact 
(al Mithaq al-Watani) was created; only Maronites and Sunnis were included in the 
discussions. Minimizing the representation of the Shi’a, despite their equal proportion 
with Sunnis in the country’s population, described the U.S. Department of State as (each 
making up 27% of the Muslim population),51 the National Pact also limited the 
presidency of the country to a Maronite Christian who could override or veto any 
parliamentary decision. From the Shi’a’s perspective, this affirmed the negligence of 
their community from the Shi’a’s perspective: “The National Pact—built on centuries of 
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exclusion, marginalization, and under representation—created a deep resentment of the 
Lebanese ruling sects and developed a perceived identity crisis within the Shi’a 
community.”52  
The year 1959 is an important year in the history of the Shi’a in both Iraq and 
Lebanon. In Iraq, 1959 marked the dominance of the Ba’ath Party, which continued to 
oppress the Shi’a. In Lebanon, however, it marks the revival of the Lebanese Shi’a 
because of the arrival of a Shi’a Imam (higher clergy man), Musa al-Sadr. Unlike the 
negligence of the Shi’a in Iraq, the negative treatment of the community in Lebanon was 
more obvious. Although the Shi’a were later recognized by the Lebanese National Pact as 
the “third most important ethnic group demographically,53 it did not receive the political 
and socioeconomic attention due its significance. This led the Shi’a to accelerate their 
motives toward political change and insertion into the Lebanese political system. They 
remained peripheral for a long time and began to surface only after the Shah of Iran was 
indirectly involved in speaking for them.  
The geographical location of the Lebanese Shi’a supported the movement; the 
Shi’a populate the southern border of Lebanon, which is shared with the then-new Israel. 
The increased tension and resentment of the Shi’a, in particular, toward the Sunni assured 
a conflict. The creation of Lebanon’s new southern neighbor, Israel, expanded on this 
tension and made it more definitive. The establishment of Israel was not necessarily a 
direct motive for the Shi’a’s movement, but rather an indirect one. Because many 
Palestinians were either forced or voluntarily had to flee their country to reside in 
southern Lebanon, where many of them still live, they had to share land and resources 
with the already poor and neglected Shi’a. Moreover, the presence of Israel in the region 
gave Iran a second reason to have an indirect influence on Lebanon’s politics. Iran used 
this as an excuse, claiming the support of the “Shi’a brothers” to help them receive their 
economic and political recognition. The evolution of the Lebanese Shi’a can be reviewed 
during three main sociopolitical events in the country’s history.  
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A. THE ARRIVAL OF IMAM AL-SADR AND THE FORMATION OF THE 
AMAL MOVEMENT 
The arrival of Imam Sadr to Lebanon revived the Shi’a on all levels: it gave them 
a sense of self-esteem, identity, and political representation; in return he gained respect 
and support until recent years.  
Sadr used Islamic beliefs and laws to reform the Shi’a community. The Shi’a 
remained inactive until the arrival of the high-ranking cleric Musa al-Sadr, who had 
gained the loyalty of the Shi’a community in the region. Through him, Iran sought to 
intervene indirectly in Lebanon’s politics. Sadr received his advanced religious education 
in Najaf, a southern province of Iraq and Qom, southwest of Tehran the Iranian capital, 
where he also resided for some time. Sadr received great respect at first because of his 
religious education degree, which allowed him to gain support and empathy from the 
Shi’a. Sadr started to gradually improve the socioeconomic status of the Lebanese Shi’a. 
He noted that areas where the Shi’a resided in Lebanon were lacking simple and basic 
services, and he supported the expansion of education and educational opportunities. To 
educate Lebanese Shi’a and to establish basic services and schools, al-Sadr needed to 
acquire some form of funding structure that he could rely on. For this, he turned to Islam 
by reemphasizing the importance of charity (Zakat), and reminded the Shi’a community, 
with references to verses in the Qur’an, of the importance of supplying the poor: “…the 
Shi’a were considered the poor cousins in the multi-congressional political system that 
had formed during the twelfths century.”54 Zakat in Islam means the support of the 
needy; thus, funds started to flow.  
Sadr immediately realized that, to obtain respect, recognition, and political power 
in the Lebanese government, and to increase employment rates among the Shi’a, 
educating them had to become his first priority. He succeeded in institutionalizing the 
Shi’a community to a great extent from its previous status: in 1960, he built a vocational 
school in southern Lebanon that is still in existence; he continued the social work of 
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charity and philanthropy to provide the basic needs to the Shi’a areas; and he established 
the Islamic Shi’ite Higher Council that represents the Shi’a community.55 
Sadr’s success granted him much appreciation from the Shi’a; his efforts 
gradually elevated their living conditions and their self-esteem. Despite his higher 
education in religious studies, mainly Shi’ism, Sadr was known to be moderate in his 
practices, a feature for which he was well-regarded, not only by the Shi’a community in 
Lebanon, but also by the Shi’a in Iraq and the Shah of Iran. His main concern in Lebanon 
continued to be the overall improvement of the condition of Lebanese Shi’a. Finally, he 
created Harakat-al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived) in 1974 to seek political 
recognition in the Lebanese government: “he vowed to struggle relentlessly until security 
needs and social grievances of the deprived—in practice the Shi’a—were addressed by 
the government.”56  
Sadr unintentionally put into place the foundation and model for other Shi’a 
organizations to follow, such as Amal and Hezbollah. Through continuous lobbying, Sadr 
was able to receive the Lebanese government’s recognition for Shi’a representation in the 
position of the Speaker of the Parliament, which was then, and still is, a limited position. 
Nevertheless, this was promising and progressive from the Shi’a’s perspective 
considering their previous status. Although Sadr achieved the political representation he 
desired for the Shi’a, his main concern remained to develop their socioeconomic status, 
which continued to recover.  
Sadr’s methodology in Lebanon was to distant himself from the country’s politics, 
on a national and an international level. As a result, did not get too involved in the overall 
politics of Lebanon and what pertained to the Lebanese struggle with the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in southern Lebanon; rather, he remained focused on his 
goals for the Shi’a community. His Shi’a support continued to grow until his mysterious 
disappearance in 1978, which caused the Shi’a community to become more unified, 
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especially after they won the position of the Speaker of the Parliament, which meant they 
at last had a voice in the government.  
The Shi’a community became more independent and started to organize its 
society as institutions for civil rights as well as defensive militia. Afwaj-al-Muqawama, 
known as Amal, for instance, was organized to continue carrying on the mission of al-
Sadr, to ensure the education of the Shi’a and better standards of living, and to defend 
Shia’ from the new enemy, Israel, across the Lebanon border. This provided both a 
motive and valuable opportunity by the PLO to gain the sympathy and support of the 
Lebanese Shi’a. Amal and the Shi’a in general, who had been neglected for so long, felt 
the need to gain military power as well as political presentation. It was the PLO who 
granted them an opportunity to do so. 
B. THE CIVIL WAR (1975–1992) 
This period of Lebanon’s history brought many domestic, regional, and foreign 
affairs to a climax. The Lebanese Civil War had advantages and disadvantages on the 
Shi’a community in Lebanon. The country’s already complicated politics and multiethnic 
governance continued to hinder the stability of the Shi’a community in the country. 
Evidence shows that the mostly Christian-dominant Lebanon during the twentieth century 
had higher employment rates for Christians than for Muslims, and that among Muslims 
there was a higher percentage of Sunnis than Shi’as. Additionally, education was also a 
problem for Lebanon’s diverse religions and sects. During Lebanon’s occupancy by the 
French, Lebanese Christians received their education while studying in France because 
they were better off financially. The Muslim community, however, felt threatened by the 
presence of Western culture in the country. Muslims wanted to preserve their religious 
rituals, traditions, and culture. At the time, Muslims educated their children at established 
Arabic or Islamic schools, either Turkish or the Farsi schools in the region. Nevertheless, 
educational opportunities inside the country were lacking, and the few that existed were 
externally influenced: “[The French….establish[ed] the University of St. Joseph in 1875. 
In 1960, a Muslim religious endowment opened the private Arab University of Beirut…. 
The American University of Beirut (established in 1866 as the Syrian Protestant College) 
 39 
is comparatively more cosmopolitan, with students who are Sunnis, Shiites, Druzes, 
Greek Orthodox, and Protestant.”57 
The presence of the Palestinian refugee camps at Lebanon’s southern border 
added to the fragility of the country and further split the Sunni and Shi’a communities. 
The Lebanese government did not allow Palestinians to integrate with its own citizens, 
because doing so would have changed the country’s demographics and make Muslims the 
majority.58 Palestinians, however, were not content to reside in refugee camps; they 
wanted to fight Israel by using their convenient geographical location from southern 
Lebanon. However, neither the Lebanese government nor any of its powers had an 
interest in initiating any form of battle or war against their southern neighbor, Israel. The 
Palestinians soon formed the PLO, also called the Popular Front, to fight from where they 
were living in despair. For the PLO to continue its fight from the Lebanese borders 
(Lebanese government did not reciprocate such actions), it was necessary for the new 
organization to receive support from the Lebanese citizens to be able to move more 
freely. But the PLO also wanted to create division in the Lebanese society that would 
preoccupy the government with domestic concerns rather than the Palestinian camps and 
their military plans.  
The ongoing Palestinian–Israeli tension across the Lebanese southern border 
erupted in numerous Israeli attacks and hostility in southern Lebanon, where the majority 
of Shi’a resided. This caused the Shi’a to flee to Beirut. Once more, migrating and 
settling in the suburbs of Beirut kept the Shi’a marginalized. Because most of those who 
migrated were farmers, they lacked skills, education, and resources: “The poverty belt 
around Beirut was inhabited by the [Shi’a] from South Lebanon and their coreligionists 
from the Beq’a Valley of eastern Lebanon, who had migrated voluntarily in search for 
better opportunities.”59 
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The Shi’a succeeded in achieving political acknowledgment, but encountered a 
drift in religious beliefs. The new lifestyle and their thirst for a political voice caused 
many of the Shi’a community to become attracted to communism, which prevailed at the 
time, and its political reforms in the region. Amal was not pleased with the shift in the 
political direction of the Shi’a community and planned to redirect those who were 
interested in joining the communist party to join his movement instead. Many Shi’a were 
motivated to join Amal’s movement as a means for political and military representation. 
These social and political changes allowed external influences on Lebanon’s politics, and 
eventually, led to a civil war. 
The break out of the Lebanese Civil War brought the significance of the Shi’a role 
to the country’s politics and internal stability. Although the precise cause of the Lebanese 
Civil War has not been clearly identified, it is clear that external and internal politics 
paved the way for its eruption. Many researchers and politicians believe it was due to the 
presence of foreign actors, such as the Palestinians and Syrians, and the influence of 
previous occupiers, such as the French and Ottomans; however, some believe that the 
Lebanese National Pact did not distribute political representation fairly. The National 
Pact did not operate as a healthy system of checks and balances, as presented, in the 
structure of “mutual veto, proportional representation, and segmental autonomy… Most 
of the politicians and major political parties criticized the pact on the ground that it failed 
to attain the original goal of creating a unified and cohesive nation.”60 This led to the 
expansion of the existing gap and tension between Lebanon’s different ethnic groups. 
Most certainly, the presence of Israel and the sharing of the Lebanese southern border 
contributed largely to both the breakout of the civil war and the presence of the Syrian 
army in Lebanon.  
One of the most important roles of the Lebanese Shi’a in Lebanon is their role in 
defending the borders. Although Israel felt it was necessary to attack and occupy 
Lebanese villages in southern Lebanon, supposedly for Israel’s own security, Syria also 
felt the necessity to protect itself and Lebanon, which was in the middle of civil war at 
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the time, from further occupation. Syria was also interested in weakening Lebanon’s 
internal politics in order to have more influence; thus, Syria decided to support the Shi’a, 
with whom it shared a border. Another outcome of the Lebanese Civil War was the 
training of some pan-Arab Shi’a by Palestinians in their fight against Israel.  
C. THE FORMATION OF HEZBOLLAH 
Various interconnected circumstances are examined here that led to the birth of 
Hezbollah, the domestic and regional perceptions on the new party, and failures and 
success of Hezbollah’s allies. One of the outcomes of the Lebanese Civil War, although 
indirect, was the founding of Hezbollah. Hezbollah can be described as a “double-agent” 
because it remains loyal to Iran and Syria, but also claims to be the defending front for 
Lebanon’s sovereignty. During and after the civil war, Amal became weaker because of 
disrupted focus; namely, the Shi’a community. Amal became distracted by internal fights, 
taking sides, and settling differences with Palestinian resistant militia groups residing in 
Lebanon. At the same time, Shi’a scholars who had been studying in religious-Shi’a 
schools in Najaf, south of Iraq, returned; the current Hezbollah leader, Hassan-Nasr-Allah 
was one of them.  
The Iraq–Lebanon–Iran Shi’a identity network was building slowly, but 
continuously. The Shi’a scholars who had returned from Iran were not only influenced by 
their studies, but also by Iraqi Shi’a scholars who resented the Iraqi government for 
escorting al-Khomeini back to Iran. This had left many Shi’a scholars angry because they 
viewed this act toward the Ayatollah to be disrespectful and limiting to all Shi’as’ 
religious practices. The agony of the returned Shi’a scholars was matched by internal 
political incidents in Lebanon: the ongoing civil war has left Lebanon more ethnically 
and politically divided. Such events presented a young Shi’a scholar, Nasrallah—
described as “revolutionist” by Norton—the opportunity to idealize another Shi’a group 
with a more military focus than Amal.  
The new Shi’a “revolutionary” group successfully initiated the Hezbollah party 
for many reasons. In the southern part of Lebanon, where most Lebanese Shi’a were still 
residing, Hezbollah presented itself as a defensive force against the violations of Israel 
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against Lebanon and its southern borders, in particular. In fact, Hezbollah refers to itself 
as “Islamic Resistance.” This patriotic slogan was also appealing to Syria, who found the 
young enthusiasts just as protective of Syrian borders against Israeli aggressions; it was 
also a political distraction to Lebanon and justified its military presence there. Norton 
also states that: “Supporting Hezbollah allowed Syria to maintain its alliance with Iran, 
gain the means for striking indirectly at both Israel and the United States and keep its 
Lebanese allies, including Amal movement, in line.”61 
On the other hand, Iran’s interest in supporting the young Hezbollah party was at 
first purely religious; “[T]o spread the message of the self-styled ‘Islamic Revolution.’”62 
However, Iran’s support of Hezbollah was not consistent. In fact, there was a shift in its 
support as soon as its leader changed. Despite the reduced support of Iran, Hezbollah kept 
strong ties with Iran, who it regards as an Islamic state model and a counselor for its 
political initiatives. In reality, the Lebanese Civil War continued until the early 1990s, 
despite the numerous attempts to stop it. Finally, all parties involved had met and agreed 
on the “al-Taaif” accord, which set a condition that all militia members be disarmed. 
Hezbollah agreed to the accord, but claimed that it was essential for the party to keep its 
arms because it is a resistance party: “Hezbollah,…signed on to the accord only after the 
Iranian government gave its blessing, justified the maintenance of its armed forces by 
calling them ‘Islamic resistance’ groups, not militias, committed to end Israel’s 
occupation.”63 
Gaining the support of the main players in the region, such as Iran and Syria, 
provided Hezbollah a strong role in the region’s politics. But in fact, it was Hezbollah’s 
achievements against Israel that idealized its presence in the country and the region as a 
whole. These achievements were not regarded as actions undertaken by a group of Shi’a, 
but rather by a heroic party the Arab region needed: in a number of incidents, Hezbollah 
                                                 
61 Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 
35. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 83. 
 43 
succeeded in restraining Israel and brought about desirable results for the Lebanese 
community (for example, the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon).  
Hezbollah got a chance to prove itself as a resistance force against Israel when 
Israel occupied southern Lebanon during the Litani operation in an aim to keep the 
Palestinian attacks as far as possible from its inhabited areas. Despite the numerous 
attempts by different political and militia groups to liberate southern Lebanon, it was 
Hezbollah’s tactics and resistance that led eventually to its liberation: “By the 
1990s,…Hezbollah was carrying out most of the attacks, each appearing to have been 
characterized by careful planning and well-practiced professionalism….[I]ts deadliest 
[attack] was so unexpected that Israel did not even know initially how it had happened 
and for years persisted in saying that the explosion was caused by a ‘gas leakage.’”64 
Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. This allowed many Shi’a who had been 
forced to leave their home to return to their properties. This in turn led to the party’s more 
influential power and charisma in the region and among the Lebanese; moreover; 
Hezbollah continued its dedication toward Lebanese Shi’a by building schools, providing 
jobs, and offering health care. 
Hezbollah strives to keep its image as a religious, political, and military resistance 
to foreign involvements. It justifies its military actions against Israel as resistance: more 
passive and reflective rather than taking the initiatives of arranging and planning for 
targets. Politicians debated the presence of Hezbollah (who later became characterized 
and listed as a terrorist group) in Lebanon as a potential obstacle for the country’s 
stability and foreign relations. Hezbollah’s popularity may be derived from its successful 
resistance to Israel, but it is also a source of blame for attacks against Lebanon: “When 
Hezbollah’s fighters carry out attacks against Israeli soldiers, the civilian population of 
South Lebanon often bears the brunt of Israel’s reprisals…Israel has targeted civilians in 
an attempt to turn them against the Islamic Resistance.”65 The July war in 2006 between 
Hezbollah and Israel is an example; it lasted thirty-three days and caused both Israel and 
Lebanon great casualties, affecting both countries’ economies.  
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Today, Hezbollah has succeeded in attaining seats in the Lebanese Parliament and 
achieving a political role in Lebanese politics. Yet, it is not the only Shi’a representation 
in the Lebanese Parliament; Amal is just as vocal. Amal is supported mainly by its good 
relations with other ethnic political groups. It also keeps the original objectives of its 
founder Musa-al-Sadr: educating and providing social services to the Lebanese Shi’a 
community, but it cannot compare to the efforts of Hezbollah. Hezbollah is supported by 
large sums of money from Iran, estimated at $100 million a year.66 Hezbollah assures 
that its subordinates are living well.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The case of the Lebanese Shi’a reveals common roots with other Shi’a in the 
region, but it also reveals their weakness as an independent power or society, preventing 
them from being unified with other Shi’a. The Shi’a in Iraq and Iran are a religious 
group, but they are not a dominant religious group in Lebanon. They are indifferent in 
their political views and biases, domestically and regionally. Their loyalty is scattered 
between their Shi’a identity, nationalism, and the country that supports them financially, 
which is Iran.  
Moreover, there are many variables that bring the sturdiness of Hezbollah into 
question. First, the Lebanese political system is sensitive to the country’s multiethnic and 
religious nature. These ethnic groups are also present in other countries in the region, 
such as Syria, Iraq, and Jordan; consequently, they are influenced by external affairs. 
Second, Lebanon’s weak economic system makes it prone to external influences. Saudi 
Arabia and Iran often support Lebanon economically; however, there are conflicts of 
interest and sectarian tension between these two aiding countries. Given the 
circumstances, it is difficult for Lebanon to ignore either country. Third, the role of Iran 
in supporting Hezbollah infinitely is not assured. In the past, Iran supported the Amal 
movement led by the late Sadr. It was considered necessary to raise their voices, and then 
the identity, of Shi’a in Lebanon. However, when Amal did not satisfy Iran’s interest in 
the country or region, Iran supported the founding of Hezbollah: Iran’s political and 
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financial support to Hezbollah added to the gap between the two Shi’a groups. Fourth, the 
ongoing tension between Hezbollah and Amal over political views speaks against 
unification between them. Additionally, other Lebanese ethnic groups and their stance 
toward Hezbollah are indifferent. 
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IV. IRAN 
This thesis treats Iran as an independent variable in analyzing the possibility of a 
unified Shi’a power. Iran is the only state in the region that identifies itself as an “Islamic 
Republic”; has a constitution, regardless of number of revisions; strictly adheres to Shi’a 
Islamic laws; has the only Shi’a military power; has a stable economy as one of the oil 
exporting countries; and has influenced sectarian uprising in other countries.  
The situation of the Shi’a in Iran does not correlate to their life and circumstances 
in both Iraq and Lebanon. Although the Shi’a in Iraq and Lebanon were victimized 
socioeconomically and socio-politically in Iran, they have had the status of power and 
authority. Historical studies indicate that Iranian political strategies are motivated by the 
need to protect and preserve their independent identity and to bring back the Persian 
Empire; thus, their motive toward the rise of Shi’ism is politically driven. It is important 
to also stress that the Shi’a in Iran are the majority, “inasmuch as about [89]67 percent of 
the people of Iran are Shi’is and Shi’ism is the official religion in Iran.”68 
The Iranian Shi’a political complaints are not limited to Sunni rulers, they also 
include the Arabs. Historically, this resentment goes back to the Persian Empire, which 
stretched from today’s Libya to Pakistan, including Iraq. Some countries like Egypt and 
Syria were part of the Byzantine Empire until the spread of Islam. By the time Islam had 
arrived to the area, there had been major social and political shifts and Arabic had 
become the prominent language of the region. Because many Iranians had converted to 
Islam, the Farsi language relied heavily on using the Arabic script. Iran’s geographical 
location among numerous Arabic-speaking countries mandated that it distinguish itself 
from the Arab world and maintain its own non-Arab identity. Moreover, Iran also wanted 
to force its sociopolitical influence on the Arab region. On the other hand, the Arab 
rulers, who have mainly been Sunni, used sectarianism to distance Iran from the Arab 
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world and its politics, something that has backfired in today’s interregional affairs. In 
additional to its strategic geographical location in the region, Iran is also a wealthy 
country of significant oil resources and is viewed by Arab states as pro-West. Identity, 
pride, and sectarian tension with Arabs have been strong through many eras of history, 
even as early as the Persian Empire.  
The Persian Empire succeeded in structuring the empire through developing the 
earliest banks, labor-wages systems, agricultural care and foresting, and architecture. 
According to Aramajani, the Persian king who had the absolute power, followed a liberal 
method in governing its people: “The Persians did not impose their religion or customs 
upon the conquered people…Their tolerance and flexibility was implemented through a 
superb system of administration.”69 As a result, the prosperous empire faded because of 
Islam. The spread of Islamic ideology and its proposed lifestyle caused confusion and 
opposition, but the aim of rebuilding the empire seems had been revisited through the 
empire of the Safavid.  
The Safavid came into dominance of the region by 1500. They were very 
passionate about Shi’ism and eager to widely spread its theologies. Shi’ism during the 
Safavid Empire became dominant, because Shah Esmail (one of the first Shahs to rule the 
empire and who disapproved of the successive Sunni caliphates), claimed to be a 
descendent of Prophet Mohammad; therefore, they neglected the Sunnis, which meant 
spreading Shi’ism may have occurred unintentionally.  
According to Shi’ism, males traditionally have been the leaders of the 
community: “The Shi’ism of [the] Safavid was of the militant “extremist” type 
reminiscent of the earliest Shi’ism; a belief in divine incarnation was important, the 
Safavid leaders were considered divine, and egalitarianism was strong. …The 
Safavid...began to moderate their views and search for orthodox Shi’a books and 
leaders.”70 In the military, leadership was inherited from father to son, which was 
acceptable because it was a rooted tradition. The leader was regarded as the head of 
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religious guidance as well as the chief of military. So, when Shekh Hyder was killed by 
the ruler of Azerbaijan, his thirteen-year-old son Shah Esmail became the ruler and 
ordered retaliating military operations for his father’s death: “In January fifteenth 1502, 
Esmail defeated the Army of Alvand Beig of Aq Qoyunlu, ruler of Azerbaijan, and seized 
Tabriz and made this city his capital. The Safavid went on and conquered the rest of 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Khorasan; they became the strongest force in Iran, and their 
leader Esmail, now fifteen, was declared Shah on March 11, 1502. However, the strength 
of the Safavid was not sufficient to contain the tribes that resided in Iran at that time, such 
as the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Baluchi. Shah Esmail had particularly disregarded the 
Sunnis, so the Safavid had these tribes keep their own tribal leaders, but they maintained 
the central rulers for Persia. The Empire had militarily succeeded in its expansion through 
conquests. 
A. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: THE ROOTS FOR THE REGIONAL 
SHI’A IDENTITY 
This thesis sees the Iranian Revolution as a product of the political motive to 
overthrow the Shah and not to establish an Islamic regime. Defending Islam and the 
Islamic identity was a cover for the revolution leaders used to gain public support. And, 
in supporting this, the Iranian constitution provided another excuse to bring Khomeini 
into power: he was a Shi’a. It was, then, Khomeini who stretched the cover of Islamic 
state structure and Shi’ism to gain power, expand, and influence politics domestically and 
regionally.  
During the twentieth century, the drafting and implementation of the Iranian 
constitution determined its future religious and political governance style by Shi’a 
Islamic laws. The constitution supported velayat-e-faqih, or the ruling of the jurist. The 
Iranian constitution was first implemented in 1906 by a clergy: it remained obedient to 
Islamic laws and only it favored one of the Shi’a schools. Therefore, the constitution 
forced a radical lifestyle on Iranians, who have a more liberal political history. However, 
there was the call for identity and nationalism to be made more prominent. The Shah, 
Reza Khan, who ruled from 1925 to 1941, had succeeded in gaining popularity by taking 
the first initiative toward bringing significance to the country’s identity by changing its 
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name from Persia to Iran. Yet, his popularity had also grown to be a strong dominant 
personality internally. Regardless of his enthusiasm and aim in pronouncing the Iranian 
identity, he was not able to get rid of the Soviets who at the time controlled nearly half of 
northern Iran while the British were in Iraq, just south of Iran. Surely, once the tensions, 
which led to World War I, started to intensify between the British and the Soviets, Khan 
was forced to give-up his position: “The next Anglo-Soviet move was to force Reza Shah 
to abdicate in favor of his 22-year-old son…[H]e was sent to exile…and died in 
Johannesburg, in 1944.”71  
The new Shah countered what his father had done in order to strengthen Iran. The 
new Shah was very young, and external influences and political changes in the region 
were major. The new Shah, M. Reza Pahlavi, had become reliant and dependent on the 
foreign powers for support, including the United States, for nearly 35 years. The turning 
point in nationalist attitude that had started to build under Reza, the father, against the 
condescending and pro-Westerners Iran was not well-tolerated. Iranians perceived this as 
a serious threat to their religious beliefs: “Feelings of inferiority, deep resentment, and 
prudent obsequiousness to the strong are reflected in Iranian attitudes toward both 
powerful nations and their own destinies.”72 Some serious domestic events forced the 
inexperienced Shah to reflect and make radical changes; he improved the economic 
system by reforming, financing, and developing farms and pasture lands. However, the 
Shah excluded political reforms; therefore, there was a lack of political participation and 
institutions.  
In addition to the political suppression some clergyman had felt during the Shah’s 
rule, in 1963 a strong opposition rose in some mosques, which resented and did not 
financially benefit from the radical economic reforms. Iran has been a true example in 
modern political history as it constantly tries to battle a fine segregation between state 
and religious ruling. But, this also means Iran is domestically fragile. The Shah then had 
showed its weakness by standing up for some powerful clergymen and by continuing to 
                                                 




be dependent on foreign political support: “The political evolution of Iran’s revolution is 
the story of the emergence of an opposition despite the regime’s efforts first to preempt 
and then to counter it.”73 Some literature also suggests that it was the Shah’s own doing 
that weakened him, as he dominated his government nearly in a dictatorial fashion. 
Eventually, growing resentment toward the Shah led to some extreme violent acts and 
uprisings, including those against foreigners residing in Iran—among which were the 
American students at Tehran University.  
It was the Ayatollah Khomeini who sought the opportunity to rebel against the 
Shah and his not-so-Islamic style of rule. The popularity of Khomeini, who invited his 
followers to join him in the name of “martyrdom” to save Islamic identity and the 
country, was also largely growing, especially when the Shah implemented a policy of 
liberalization, which countered conservative Islam: “[I]ncessant chanting of ‘Allaho 
Akbar’ (God is Great) and ‘Khomeini Rahbaranieh’ (Khomeini Is Our Leader).”74 Thus, 
the anti-West revolution and the restricted Iranian constitution (the ruler of the country 
must be of the twelever-Shi’ism [a sect of Shi’a believes that there shall be twelve rulers 
to lead Islam, and it is the twelfth who would bring umma to justice and true Islam])75 
resulted in replacing the Shah with Ayatollah Khomeini. Hence, the new regime to 
govern Iran abruptly changed to a radical one in a political shift that changed politics 
domestically and regionally. Though, if politicians viewed the Shah’s autocratic way of 
governing as an error that led to increased opposition, then Khomeini would have 
practiced the same style, except it was legitimized through Shi’ism. 
Although the Shah understood Iran’s sensitive geographical location, he aimed to 
maintain good relationships with neighboring countries, especially the Arab states. 
Khomeini, however, kept provoking these ties, especially with Saudi Arabia: “[T]he 
ideological challenge from Iran took two forms: that of attacking the Saudi regime as 
incompatible with true Islam and that of accusing the Saudis of being a forward base of 
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American imperialism in the Middle East.”76 There were a number of Iranian attempts to 
expand their revolution to the Arab world, until the breakout of the Iraq-Iran War in 
1980.  
B. THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR: THE SHI’A IDENTITY VERSUS ARAB 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The Iranian new revolution and its radical Shi’a leader were unwelcome in Iraq as 
much as they were in Saudi Arabia. However, Iraq had more reasons to act aggressively 
toward Iran. Internally, the relatively new Iraqi regime headed by Saddam Hussein was 
battling al-Da’wa party (or the “Call” party, which is a Shi’a party that called for an 
Islamic state; umma”). Also, three small islands in the Persian Gulf were claimed by both 
Iraq and Iran, and their official territorial nationalism had not been determined; this added 
to the tensions. The mutual religious ties and loyalty that Khomeini had with high-ranked 
Iraqi Shi’a clergies also created tension. It was normal for Saudi to be the first of the 
Arab countries to side with Iraq, although the main reason was the actual Iranian threat to 
the Saudi inter-political stability, but Saudi assured Iraq that it was going to support it in 
the name of “Arab brotherhood.” Other Gulf and Arab states followed the Saudis’ 
position in regard to Iraq. The Iraq-Iran War brought the region into a bipolar power 
struggle; it include not only the two countries involved, but also divided the region into 
two sides: pro-Saddam and pro-Khomeini (the latter included Syria, Democratic Republic 
of Yemen, Algeria, and Libya). 
Khomeini continued his preaching about Islamic laws and the Shi’a identity. He 
turned to his colleagues at Najaf hawza (a Shi’a religious school) and continued to use 
the war as a holy war against anti-Islam, undertaken by Saddam’s regime: “Khomeini had 
managed to turn the war into an Iranian national crusade, with Saddam Hussein the Satan 
who had to be cast out.”77 Khomeini’s persistence in highlighting his ties to Iraqi Shi’a 
increased the Ba’athist agony toward Shi’a; the Iraqi government often accused Iraqi 
Shi’a of being loyal to Iran. As a result, Shi’a celebrations and rituals became forbidden 
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in Iraq, popular Shi’a leaders and their followers were killed, and thousands of Shi’a were 
sent to exile in Iran, accused of being loyal to Iran or of Iranian origin. Khomeini’s 
actions during the Iraq-Iran War certainly did not help Shi’a in Iraq; in fact, it regressed 
them politically, socially, and economically. Furthermore, both Iraqi and Iranian armies 
were fighting along the shared southern border of Iraq, which happens to be mostly 
populated by Shi’a. It is recorded that some of the bloodiest battles were naturally those 
that occurred in the border lands.  
Khomeini started to address all Shi’a in the Arab region. He succeeded in raising 
the opposition to the Shi’a minorities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi. It is then when 
Khomeini became the voice of Shi’a and was regarded by many Shi’a as the Imam or 
religious leader. Shi’ism and the Shi’a identity was not the only aspect Khomeini 
attempted to stir as a means of causing political instability in the Arab region; he also 
accused a number of Arab leaders as being “dependents” of the United States, and as a 
result unable to make any decision on their own. He repeatedly reminded Muslim Arabs 
that their political systems (mostly socialists) adopted a foreign ideology that was alien 
and conflicts with Islamic beliefs. Nevertheless, the minorities of Arab Shi’a had been 
preconditioned to such a rival against their governments and responds positively to 
Khomeini’s messages—they were treated as minority groups, with little, if any, political 
representation. Therefore, all uprisings were put down by Arab governments.  
Although the Iranian government had some success in agitating Arab Shi’a and 
leading them to rise in opposition against their governments, it also inflicted growing 
opposition on itself. The regime became radical Islamist that forced a restricted lifestyle 
upon its citizens: “[T]he regime’s puritanical policies [included] the banning of music 
and entertainment programs on television and radio, and the requirement of the hijab 
(Islamic dress) for women.”78 In addition to the state’s restraining policies, the Iranian 
economy regressed despite its oil exports, mainly due to war cost, but also due to Iran’s 
deteriorated foreign affairs, especially its relations with members of the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries, whose most members were pro-Saddam. The new 
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political and economic restrains led many middle class families to flee the country; they 
were “members of the managerial sector.”79 
The Iraq-Iran War highlighted the failure of the Iranian Revolution and its regime; 
it eventually prevented it from expanding, which was the hope of Khomeini. Most 
important, the war brought the regions’ relations into focus, especially those of Iran–Arab 
and Iran–non-Muslim countries. However, the war also indicated the possibility of 
sectarian politics in the region; the Shi’a demographic and population percentage in the 
region is a factor that should be considered when examining politics of the Middle East. 
The war may have been the first incident that caused the uprising of Shi’a in various parts 
of the region, but it was insufficient to motivate a sectarian identity.  
C. THE SHI’A IDENTITY: A CONTROL MECHANISM  
This thesis finds that the Shi’a identity rivals (in Iraq and Lebanon) are used as a 
mechanism to empower, restrain, and influence political powers in the region. The period 
after the Iraq-Iran War, especially after the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, has 
been a real test of the Shi’a identity and its endurance in the region’s politics. The 
outcome of many political and military incidents in the region can be simplified in the 
form of a right triangle that represents the Shi’a ties in Iran, Iraq, and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon. The descriptive definition of a right triangle is intended in this context: because 
Iran has been the major power and the steering wheel (directly or indirectly) for Shi’a 
movements in the area, it is the 90-degree angle that composes one half of the triangle. 
Iraq and Hezbollah combined make up the other one half.  
When American forces overthrew Saddam and dissolved the Iraqi military and its 
high-ranked officers, there was resentment among Saddam’s supporters, who were 
Sunnis. The resulting conflict between the Iraqi Sunnis and the American forces, and the 
accumulated ambition of the Iraqi Shi’a for power, granted them the ultimate opportunity 
to achieve their goal. Iran, too, sought this imminent opportunity to distract the United 
States and veer its attention away from Iran. Hence, Iran relied on its Shi’a identity to 
destabilize the presence of American forces in Iraq, establish a Shi’a support model that 
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would motivate the Shi’a in other Arab states, and possibly threaten Israel with a possible 
Shi’a front alliance against it. The actions of Iran were not random. In fact, Iran relied on 
past events in implementing its strategy in the Middle East. For example, the Iranian 
Revolution had succeeded because of numerous uprisings in a number of Arab countries 
(Kuwait, Saudi, and Bahrain) incited by Khomeini in which Shi’a groups rose against 
their governments. Most Gulf Shi’a are led by Iraqi marja’iyya (a religious source) who 
completed their education in one of the hawzas in Najaf south of Iraq, and then were sent 
off to a Gulf state. Therefore, Iran’s influence on Iraqi Shi’a clergymen indirectly 
influences the Shi’a groups in the region. Hezbollah has proved itself a capable militia 
power that can militarily threat or destabilize Israel when supported by Iran.  
Studies of Iraq–Iran Shi’a relations are a strong indication that Iran has used its 
Shi’a pride to connect and influence Iraqi Shi’a and not form a unity with them. As the 
Iraqi Shi’a took power, there was an inevitable Shi’a division that was due to political 
and Shi’ism methodology, rank of the marja’iyya, and an interesting concern, the 
marja’iyya’s national loyalty. Iraqi Shi’a encountered a new dilemma once they reached 
power: two scholars of high religious rank with completely different approaches to 
politics. Ayatollah Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the Shi’a scholars, whose father was 
murdered on Saddam’s orders, wanted to claim power in Iraq. However, his methodology 
for fighting the Americans, and wanting revenge against the Sunni, made him less 
popular. Moreover, because of his success in forming his own army to fight against the 
Americans in Iraq, he was sent to exile in Iran, where he spent much of his young 
adulthood; as a result, he is often perceived as the executer of Iran’s agenda in Iraq. 
Later, he tried to counteract these allegations by emphasizing his natural birth as an Arab 
rather than that of is popular counter, Ali al-Sistani.
80
 But, it was evident that Sadr needed 
Iran’s support to carry own his plans, and so he received Iranian support: “ Encouraged 
by the Iranian backing and money, Sadr shifted from familial-populist politics to radical 
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fundamentalism in line with Iranian plans to create a broad Islamic condition from 
Lebanon to the West Bank and Iraq.”81 
The other scholar is Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, who has a more moderate 
approach. He sees his role as a scholar is to protect and defend the faith and not to govern 
it. Unlike Sadr, al-Sistani supported the American forces’ entry to Iraq in an exchange for 
governing the country. He did not get involved in Iran’s politics and received the 
disapproval of his Iranian colleagues for his position. But, in Iraq, he “…took his stand 
on the principle of majority rule and demanded accountable and representative 
government that would reflect and protect Shi’a identity.”82 Al-Sistani wants to support 
and maintain the Shi’a identity; however, he was not supported by Iran until recently 
after his popularity started to grow domestically and regionally. Despite the Shi’a 
division in Iraq, Iran played no role, nor were there any attempts to unify Iraqi Shi’a. Iran 
did not call for unity among the divided Iraqi Shi’a; rather, Iran supports the Shi’a leader 
who would support its objective of power and control of Iraq.  
On the other hand, in Lebanon, Hezbollah is subjugated to Iran’s objectives in the 
region. In fact, initially Hezbollah was regarded as an Iranian militia. Its nationalism and 
loyalty was under severe scrutiny by Lebanese and Arabs in general. Moreover, 
Hezbollah was only recognized as an Arab-Lebanese resistance force after it had won the 
war against Israel in the summer of 2006. Nevertheless, Hezbollah considers Iran as its 
idol in being structured as an Islamic state. Similarly, Iran has been supportive of 
Hezbollah: “In Hezbollah’s case the issue of marja’iyya has been determined on the 
doctrinal-ideological basis of following the official [marja’iyya] in Iran…Hezbollah’s 
religious authority was and will continue be the Iranian al-wali al-faqih…especially, after 
Khomeini appointed [himself] as Hezbollah’s godfather.”83 Additionally, Hezbollah, as 
discussed previously, relies on Iran’s financial support. Although both Hezbollah and 
Amal in Lebanon obtain their finances through charity and dues from Muslim Shi’a, 
                                                 
81 Halas Jaber, Hezbollah Born with a Vengence (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), 
23. 
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Hezbollah has advanced over Amal because of the financial support it receives from Iran, 
which is estimated in the millions of dollars annually. Thus, Hezbollah’s popularity 
depends on its capabilities, militarily and financially. However, both of Hezbollah’s 
capabilities rely on the Iran’s support.  
Iran has used its Shi’a identity to influence other Shi’a groups in the region to 
steer social and political shifts to its advantage. At the same time, by supporting these 
groups, Iran receives their support in return because they can apply pressure on their local 
governments when there is a call for it. That Shi’a scholars receive their religious 
education either in Najaf, Iraq, or Qom, Iran, will always allow for Shi’a networking, and 
thus, building ties with Shi’a in other countries.  
D. CONCLUSION 
As this thesis examines Shi’a history in Iran, it finds that Iran’s history is full of 
pride and numerous achievements, and the Shi’a identity is only a mechanism for Iran to 
gain control. Iran was the Persian Empire before the arrival of Islam, and once again 
became an empire after Islam in the Safavid era. That the Safavid were Shi’a was because 
of the demography of the then-Empire. Once in leadership, the Safavid used the religion 
and the Shi’a sect in particular, because they were the population’s majority, to gain 
control, succeed, and expand. For long period, Iran lived prosperously and liberally. For 
centuries, there were few state–religion conflicts. But, it was understandable for Iran to 
include its religion in its constitution as a form of protecting its faith from fading, 
especially because it was surrounded by Anglo-Soviets during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  
However, although the initial inclusion of Islamic laws in the Iranian constitution 
was to maintain its Islamic identity, it was understandable for a state that has practiced 
Shi’ism to specify it as its official sect. However, only one faction of the (Shi’a sect) was 
included; other factions were disregarded. This meant maintaining the division within 
Islam, and division and suppression within the Shi’a sect. The outcome of the Iranian 
Revolution was one of the constitution’s consequences, or at least it was used as such by 
Khomeini. The most important aspects of the Shi’a revival in the region were imprinted 
during the revolution. Khomeini’s success in reaching other Shi’a groups in other Arab 
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countries gave those countries and the region events to consider when planning 
interregional affairs.  
The concept of Arabs and Arab nationalism created complex Arab–Iran relations 
for decades. Iran, on the other hand, continues to define its nationalism and independency 
from the Arab world. This, too, is a complex issue for Iran; as an Islamic state, there is 
the learning, reading, reference, and recitation of Islam’s holy book the Qur’an, that is 
written in Arabic. The Qur’an is the reason the Farsi language adapted most of the Arabic 
script. Also, for its scholars to achieve its religious degree, clergymen must learn and 
understand the Arabic language. Hence, it has been challenging for Iran to maintain its 
separate identity without relying on another mechanism that gives its distinct 
identification but also links it to the region’s politics; the Shi’a identity, has become 
Iran’s instrument. 
Although Iran influences Shi’a groups in the region, it is very selective as to who 
deserves its support; specifically, this thesis examines Iraq and Lebanon, where there are 
political divisions in local Shi’a groups. For instance, Iran supported Muqtada al-Sadr in 
Iraq (financially and militarily) long before it supported al-Sistani, even though al-Sistani 
received more respect and approval of local and other Shi’a scholars. In Lebanon, Iran 
supported and continues to support Hezbollah (financially and militarily), while 
disregarding Amal, whose founder came to Lebanon to revive the Shi’a per call and 
support from Lebanon. What Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon have in 
common is they are have younger fighters, are anti-West and anti-Israel, and have 
succeeded in destabilizing their countries when Iran needed them to. Iran continues to 
exploit its mechanisms in other countries of the region where applicable: “The birth of 
Hezbollah in the Gulf is part of the same attempt by Iran to control the revolutionary zeal 
of Gulf Shi’a so that it does not endanger its diplomatic relations with its neighbors but 
can also be a useful tool of pressure if needed.”84 Hence, Iran’s mechanism of Shi’a 
identity is to win those in surrounding countries to protect it and serve its interests in the 
region.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
This thesis finds that the formation of a Shi’a unified force or power presented in 
the ideology of a Shi’a Crescent between Shi’a in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran is unlikely, and 
thus, no threat is to be feared. However, this thesis also concludes that the Shi’a identity 
is a mechanism that will continue to challenge the region’s politics and that this 
mechanism is on the rise. The research focused on three factors: sociopolitical 
representation, socioeconomic oppression, and the Shi’a identity. The summery of the 
case study comparison is as follows. 
Political and sociopolitical discrimination in Iraq was created by a foreign 
occupancy, but then used by the Ba’athist party. Iraq’s geopolitical and regional historical 
sectarian conflicts allowed for much of its political discrimination against the Shi’a. It is 
a country uniquely located near both Turkey and Iran; Turkey has a Sunni majority and 
Iran has a Shi’a majority. The Ottomans were insecure about allowing Shi’a to receive 
education or join the military; the Ba’athists had a similar fear, especially during the Iraq-
Iran War.  
In Lebanon, the Shi’a situation is best described by the “domino effect” theory: 
the political underrepresentation of Shi’a led to a decline or lack of national and regional 
networks, and consequently, a decline in their social and economic status. The Lebanese 
Shi’a remained passive until they were awakened by Sadr when he arrived from Iraq.  
In Iran, however, political presentation, power, and authority have been granted to Shi’a 
for centuries, almost since the arrival of Islam. Iranian Shi’a are the majority in the 
country. This Islamic country follows the Shi’a methodology, and despite the presence of 
other religions and Muslim sects, has a constitution that guarantees them absolute 
political power. On the socioeconomic level, once again Iraq’s geography and 
demography raised domestic and regional fears of the Shi’a; thus, they became victims of 
underdevelopment. That Iraqi Shi’a are concentrated in the southern provinces of Iraq, 
where oil fields and water gates to Gulf water are, alerted successive Iraqi governments 
of the need to be in total control of the Shi’a as a means of preventing them from gaining 
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control of the country’s natural resources—especially when these natural resources are 
located on the border with Iran.  
The Lebanese Shi’a were neglected economically, socially, and politically 
because they were illiterate farmers who mainly lived on the Lebanese border with Syria 
and therefore were less of an interest to Lebanon’s government. Iran has been financially 
supportive of the Shi’a community in Lebanon, although specifying that this aid is for 
Hezbollah and its followers.  
Even though Iran is a prosperous country, it suffered major economic setbacks 
that were the result of the country’s policies; for example, a long war with Iraq that called 
for advanced military training and armament. The outcome of these incidents was that 
many Iranian middle-class families fled the country, creating a shift in the society’s social 
classes. In terms of the economy, this has not affected the Shi’a only, but rather the entire 
country with all its ethnic and religious groups.  
The Shi’a identity is strong and the common factor in this case study; however, its 
significance is manipulated by Iran. Iran has been using the Shi’a identity factor since the 
1979 revolution. It was raised for the first time by Khomeini, who needed to benefit from 
the instability of other countries in the region for his war against Saddam and Saddam’s 
Arab allies. Despite the active Da’wa party in Iraq, initially Da’wa was calling for the 
Islamic state and the importance of maintaining Islamic laws and traditions. The 
formation of Da’wa may well have been inspired by other anti-West occupation by 
Islamic parties in the region at the time. But, it was Khomeini who succeeded in 
reminding Shi’a in other countries of their distinguished identity. The consequence of the 
call for this in Iraq was Lebanon. The Ba’athists’ fear of a possible continuation of the 
Iranian Revolution led them to continuing actions that increased the ties between the Iraqi 
and Iranian Shi’a. As a result, the Ba’athists either murdered Shi’a clerics in Iraq or 
deported them to Iran by accusing them of being of Iranian origins. They also demanded 
the end of intercultural marriage between Iraqis and Iranians. Additionally, they 
prevented Shi’a and Shi’a intellects from achieving higher positions in either the 
government or the military, even though Shi’a soldiers fought against Iran during the 
Iraq-Iran War.  
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In Lebanon, the arrival of Sadr from Iraq and his success in reviving the Shi’a 
community affected the Lebanese loyalty to their religious leaders, whether they were 
from Lebanon, Iraq, or Iran. The Iranian support of Hezbollah has continued since the 
establishment of the party. The financial supported included that of all the followers of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. This powerful support and Hezbollah’s military actions against 
Israel provide the Lebanese Shi’a the power, assertion, and strength they have longed for. 
Thus, the Shi’a in Iraq and Lebanon were forced by their rulers and by domestic politics 
to believe that they belonged to Iran because their main loyalty is to Shi’ism rather than 
their home countries.  
However, this thesis finds that Iran has been the beneficiary of politically and 
ideologically-guided regional politics. Iran uses sectarian differences to maintain and 
strengthen its power in the region, but not to form a Shi’a unity.  
First, historical evidence indicates that, throughout different periods of history, 
Iran attempted to control the region by establishing or expanding an empire (the Persian 
Empire). Second, Iran has been very selective about which Shi’a group it provides 
support to. It supported Da’wa in Iraq during Saddam’s rule because the party was anti-
Saddam. Then, it supported Muqtada al-Sadr because it was a militia group that fought 
American and international forces in Iraq. And it supported Hezbollah rather than Amal 
in Lebanon because Hezbollah, too, is a militia fighting Israel. Then, Iran’s support to the 
Shi’a went the parties and militia groups that had helped Iran in the past and could 
provide assistance when needed. The form of assistance Iran receives from these Shi’a 
groups has been military or as actors used to destabilize the region.  
Third, the Shi’a sect is divided into a number of factions. Each faction differs in 
its ideology and interpretation of Shi’ism. Therefore, before a more complex unification, 
such as the Shi’a Crescent can occur, there would be a need to unify the Shi’a ideology, 
which is already challenged. Because Iran adapts only to one ideology as it is conditioned 
per its constitution, there is no evidence of Iran attempting to raise concern about 
unifying the Shi’a sect. Iran has no interest in unifying the sect or reaching a larger union.  
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Fourth, the Muslim sectarian conflict between the Sunni and Shi’a is a prolonged 
and continuing dilemma. It is unlikely that Muslim Sunnis, who are mostly concentrated 
west of the Red Sea, will allow a Shi’a unification, because it could mean dividing the 
region into three militarily and politically powerful countries; Iran, Israel, and Egypt.  
The Shi’a Crescent is an ill-conceived term, assumed to be a without evidence. 
Historical analysis finds the development of a Shi’a Crescent or regional Shi’a unity 
unlikely. While such unity is unlikely, there is evidence that Iran has used Shi’a identity 
to influence regional groups and states. Given the historical evidence, its success in this 
endeavor does not appear imminent.  
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